Historic: 20 Jahre kriminelles Enterprise der Salih Berisha Gang und die CDU – KAS Partnerschaft des Verbrechens

Bis heute arbeitet die Deutsche CDU, KAS mit dem Verbrecher Kartell des Salih Berisha: Dr. Jung, gibt keine Antwort, warum er derartige Schwerverbrecher in Berlin in 2015 empfing, die KAS bezeichnent sogar den korrupten Extrem Verbrecher Lulzim Basha, als wichtigsten Partner auf deren Website. „Ein Kernelement der Zusammenarbeit der Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung in Albanien ist die Kooperation mit der Demokratischen Partei, unter Führung des Partaivorsitzenden, Lulzim Basha.“

In Washington: Verbrecher Organisation der Familie des Lulzim Basha macht wieder eine US Reise mit dem Gangster Fatmir Mediu

Fatmir Mediu, bezahlte für die Tochter eine US Schule mit Kosten von 40.000 $ pro Jahr, wo er nur 25.000 $ pro Jahr verdiente.

Film und Buch über die Gerdec Kathastrophe, das grösste NATO Betrugs Geschäft und der US – Albanischen Mafia

Fatmir Mediu, Dr. Franz Jung. Agron Duka
Fatmir Mediu, Dr. Franz Jung. Agron Duka in Berlin 2015

Verbrecher Kartell im grössten NATO Munitions Betrug trifft sich in Berlin.

Langzeit Gangster Syndidkats Chef der RP: Fatmir Mediu, Dr. Franz Jung und rechts der Super Gangster Agron Duka, dessen Drogen Labore in Albanien eine Legende waren vor 15 Jahren schon. Das Verbrechen ist ganz Oben angekommen, was auch nicht neu ist.

Stratfor: Salih Berisha, ist der Chef der Albanisches Mafia Clans

9/19/2012

Historic: 20 Jahre kriminelles Enterprise der Salih Berisha Gang

Der Ex-US Botschafter John Withers, sagte vor wenigen Tagen: Albanien ist wie Libyen, oder Ägypten, was noch sehr vornehm ausgedrückt ist.

Salih Berisha
Most criminal of the world: Salih Berisha und was der US Professor Shinas Rama, über diesen Banditen Clan sagt.

Das Salih Berisha Verbrecher Kartell ( Salih Berisha DP Party Mafia)hier im Focus der Geschichte.

aus Albanische Institut für internationale Studien (AIIS) – SWP-Berlin und die unsinnige Meinung über den Albanischen Nationalismus

Das Sicherheits Institut ISIS (Shkëlqim BERISHA Drejtor i ISIS), wird vom ihm geleitet, er ist aber Direktor im Verteidigungs Ministerium, wo wie in allen Ministerien, Berisha Verwandte untergebracht sind und oft die Dümmsten in Langzeit Tradtion, was an Vorgänge erinnert, welche auch der Deutschen Bundeswehr gut bekannt sind und Gerichts Akten kundig, wie schon damals Salih Berisha, schlimmer wie Enver Hoxha, eine reine Verbrecher Politik betrieb, denn nicht nur der BND war aktiv vor Ort, sondern hatte sehr gute Militär Attache’s in Albanien, welche auch nach 1997 bestens informiert waren.

Damals hatten die Deutschen durchaus sehr gute Leute, mit Charakter ausgebildet im Albanischen Militär und vor Ort.
Viele Berisha Kriminelle, bekannt für Schiessereien auf Zivilisten, sind in hohen Staats Positionen, darunter auch die Brecani Familie, ein Leitfaden für Kriminelle Clan, oder Dritan Berisha, als Interpol Chef.


ISIS

Sicherheits Institut ISIS (Shkëlqim BERISHA Drejtor i ISIS), geschaffen von dummen ausländischen NATO Gestalten mit Steuergeldern, dient wie andere solche Institute nur dazu, Fehl Inforamtionen von Profi Verbrecher Clans an Ausländer zuverkaufen.

Zustände im Verbrecher Staat: Albanien, sogar vor 20 Jahren von der Deutschen Justiz gewürdigt.

Niedersächsisches Landesjustizportal

Ein hochrangiger albanischer Offizier, der sein Heimatland im Juli 1996 wegen drohender politischer Verfolgung verlassen hat, muss im Falle der Rückkehr angesichts der Änderung der dortigen politischen Verhältnisse nicht mit einem Wiederaufleben seiner Verfolgung mit beachtlicher Wahrscheinlichkeit rechnen.
OVG Lüneburg 11. Senat, Urteil vom 18.12.2001, 11 LB 2808/01

Art 16a Abs 1 GG, § 51 Abs 1 AuslG 1990
Tatbestand

1

Mit seiner Klage wendet sich der Bundesbeauftragte für Asylangelegenheiten (Bundesbeauftragter) dagegen, dass das Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge (Bundesamt) den Beigeladenen – albanischen Staatsangehörigen – Abschiebungsschutz nach § 51 Abs. 1 AuslG hinsichtlich Albanien zugebilligt hat.

2

Der im Februar 1956 in Elbasan/Albanien geborene Beigeladene zu 1) reiste am 24. Juli 1996 – nach seinen Angaben mit einem Direktflug der makedonischen Fluggesellschaft MAT von S nach H – in die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ein. Am 16. Oktober 1996 folgten ihm – nach deren Angaben ebenfalls auf dem Luftweg mit einem Zwischenstopp in Rom – seine im Januar 2000 im Bundesgebiet verstorbene Ehefrau und seine beiden Kinder, der im März 1987 in Tirana/Albanien geborene Beigeladene zu 2) und die im Juli 1982 gleichfalls in Tirana geborene Beigeladene zu 3), nach.

3

Ihm seien seine vielfältigen guten Kontakte zu Offizieren der Bundeswehr und deutschen Privatpersonen in Deutschland und Albanien vorgehalten worden. Misstrauen habe insbesondere auch geweckt, dass er 1993 seine Familie nach Deutschland habe nachkommen lassen können; er sei gefragt worden, aus welchen Quellen er die dafür erforderlichen Mittel erhalten habe. Er sei – zu Unrecht – vom damaligen Verteidigungsminister Z. der Regierung Berisha, zu dem er früher ein gutes Verhältnis gehabt habe, und anderen Entscheidungsträgern im Verteidigungsministerium einer Agententätigkeit für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und des Geheimnisverrats politischer und insbesondere auch militärischer Informationen verdächtigt worden; in meist “4-Augen-Gesprächen” habe ihn der Verteidigungsminister gefragt, wer eigentlich sein Dienstherr sei und welchen Landes Uniform er trage: Albanien oder Deutschland?
………………

Er sei – zu Unrecht – vom damaligen Verteidigungsminister Z. der Regierung Berisha, zu dem er früher ein gutes Verhältnis gehabt habe, und anderen Entscheidungsträgern im Verteidigungsministerium einer Agententätigkeit für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland und des Geheimnisverrats politischer und insbesondere auch militärischer Informationen verdächtigt worden; in meist “4-Augen-Gesprächen” habe ihn der Verteidigungsminister gefragt, wer eigentlich sein Dienstherr sei und welchen Landes Uniform er trage: Albanien oder Deutschland? Dabei sei ihm vorgehalten bzw. vorgeworfen worden, dass er sich stets für starke und gute Beziehungen zwischen Albanien und Deutschland eingesetzt habe. Dem Ansinnen des Verteidigungsministers, ein theoretisches Konzept zur Installierung einer starken albanischen Armee unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der amerikanischen Verhältnisse zu entwickeln, habe er sich widersetzt. Diesbezüglich habe er unmittelbar nach seiner Rückkehr nach Albanien gegenüber dem Verteidigungsminister auch sein Missfallen darüber bekundet, dass die amerikanische Militärmission in demselben Gebäude residiere wie das albanische Verteidigungsministerium. Erst später habe er erfahren, dass der Kommandeur der Heeresakademie in Hannover, General v. S., zu dem er – der Beigeladene zu 1) – keinen Kontakt gehabt habe, bei internen Gesprächen in Tirana daran ebenfalls Kritik geäußert und zusätzlich nachgefragt habe, weshalb nicht er – der Beigeladene zu 1) – Kommandeur der Führungsakademie in Tirana sei; wegen der Übereinstimmung in den Einschätzungen sei ihm der Verdacht der Absprache entgegengehalten worden….
7

Oberstleutnant W. gab am 11. März 1997 an, dass der Beigeladene zu 1) im Januar/Februar 1996 durch den albanischen Verteidigungsminister ohne Angabe von Gründen seines Postens enthoben worden sei. Er habe ohne Gerichtsverfahren zum Hauptmann degradiert werden sollen. Da er die Degradierung abgelehnt habe, sei ihm mit Verhaftung und Gefängnis gedroht worden. Er sei dann untergetaucht. Seitdem habe er – der Zeuge – keinen Kontakt mehr zum Beigeladenen zu 1) gehabt (Bl. 157 BA A).

8

Oberst Dr. B., der frühere Lehrgruppenleiter der Generalstabsausbildung für ausländische Offiziere an der Führungsakademie in Hamburg, führte in einer Stellungnahme vom 12. März 1997 aus: Bei Gesprächen während der Zeit in Hamburg von September 1993 bis Juni 1994 habe sich der Beigeladene zu 1) außerordentlich interessiert gezeigt an der demokratisch verfassten Rechts- und Gesellschaftsordnung in Deutschland. Mit zunehmender Dauer seines Aufenthalts in Hamburg habe er eine wachsende kritische Haltung gegenüber den Gegebenheiten in seinem Heimatland erkennen lassen, ohne dabei jedoch seine grundsätzliche Position als herausgehobener Vertreter seines Landes zu vernachlässigen. Der Aufenthalt in Hamburg sei ihm von verschiedenen Seiten – auch finanziell – sehr erleichtert worden, so dass er seine Familie habe nachholen können. Sein – des Zeugen – abschließender Eindruck sei gewesen, dass der Beigeladene zu 1) einen ausgeprägten Interessenschwerpunkt in Bezug auf die politische, verfassungsmäßige, gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Situation entwickelt habe mit dem ausgesprochenen Ziel, die in Deutschland erfahrenen Prinzipien in seinem Heimatland zur Geltung zu bringen.
……………

Das gilt um so mehr, als es in der Zeit der Regierungen der Sozialistischen Partei in Albanien — abgesehen von zwei Ermittlungsverfahren wegen der Unruhen im März 1997 und des Putschversuchs im September 1998 — bisher nicht zu Verfahren mit politischen Hintergrund gekommen ist (vgl. Lagebericht vom 6.4.2001, S. 5).

31
Nach alledem ist der Bescheid des Bundesamtes vom 30. Juni 1997 antragsgemäß aufzuheben, soweit dem Beigeladenen zu 1) Abschiebungsschutz nach § 51 Abs. 1 AuslG zugebilligt worden ist.

32
2. Entsprechendes gilt für die Gewährung von Abschiebungsschutz nach § 51 Abs. 1 AuslG im genannten Bescheid zugunsten der Beigeladenen zu 2) und 3). Diese Entscheidung beruht auf der Einschätzung, die beigeladenen Kinder hätten wegen eines — wie zuvor dargelegt indessen nicht mehr gegebenen — Verfolgungsinteresses in Bezug auf den Beigeladenen zu 1) mit einer sippenhaftähnlichen Inanspruchnahme zu rechnen. Infolgedessen bedarf es keiner Aufklärung, ob in Albanien tatsächlich Sippenhaft praktiziert wird.

33
Die Kostenentscheidung beruht auf §§ 154 Abs. 2, 162 Abs. 3 VwGO, 83 b Abs. 1 AsylVfG.

34
Die Revision war nicht zuzulassen, weil keiner der Gründe des § 132 Abs. 2 VwGO gegeben ist.

http://www.rechtsprechung.niedersachsen.de

24-mars-2014-724x1024

How Berisha’s Inner Circle Profited from Multi-Million Euro Land Deals

Zafar Ansar: My introduction to Argita Berisha 16 Jan 13


Albania to Probe Illicit Transfers to Tax Havens
Prime Minister Sali Berisha on Tuesday called for a probe into a report’s claims that more than $1.3 billion (€983 million) were spirited out of Albania over five years.

Global Financial Integrity says corrupt elite took $1.3 billion (€983 million) out of Albania

erbien: 51,443

PDF Download Full Report [High-Res] (4.7 MB)

PDF Download Full Report [Low-Res] (3.3 MB)

PDF Download Executive Summary [Low-Res] (54 KB)

PDF Download Abstract [Low-Res] (32 KB)

19 Dec 12
$1.3bn Spirited Out of Albania, Report Says

14 Jul 14

How Berisha’s Inner Circle Profited from Multi-Million Euro Land Deals

Der Ex-US Botschafter John Withers, sagte vor wenigen Tagen: Albanien ist wie Libyen, oder Ägypten, was noch sehr vornehm ausgedrückt ist. Most criminal of the world: Salih Berisha und was der US Professor Shinas Rama, über diesen Banditen Clan sagt. Das Salih Berisha Verbrecher Kartell ( Salih Berisha DP Party Mafia)hier im Focus der Geschichte. Immer die selbe Methoden, Shows für ausländische Beobachter und geheime Anweisungen und Todes Dekrete, was bei den Schulen schon anfing, wo die Lehrer instruiert wurden in 1995, Ausländern Nichts zu Sagen und die Schulkinder mussten das Salih Berisha Bildungs System loben. Heute ist das Bildungs System vollkommen ruiniert, wo ein Rektor an der Tirana Unveristät vor kurzem sagte: die Studenten können nicht einmal einen Satz richtig schreiben. Rrokaj: Studentët nuk dinë më as shqipen bazike 18 Shtator, 2012

TRANSITIONS ONLINE: ALBANIA: Corruption Takes Its Toll On the Berisha Government

by LOUIS ZANGA

12 May 1995

CORRUPTION, INCLUDING bribery, thievery, and favors, remains the only way of getting things done in Albania, from paying electricity bills to conducting international relations. Prevalent in all the former communist countries, corruption is having an increasingly harmful effect on young democratic societies, especially in a country as poverty-stricken as Albania. Voters there registered a protest against the raging lawlessness when, at the end of 1994, they defeated a referendum on a new draft constitution. President Sali Berisha admitted that the defeat had less to do with the constitution itself than with the government’s failure to tackle corruption. The exposure of corruption within the ruling Democratic Party (PD) seems to have weakened it and has also put Berisha’s political standing in question. The 6 November defeat of the new draft constitution caused some to suggest that Berisha may not survive his full four-year presidential term, which runs through March 1996. When Berisha was elected president of Albania in 1992, following almost 50 years of communist dictatorship, one of his first moves was to declare war on corruption. Although apparently sincere in calling it Albania’s greatest enemy, Berisha has not managed to stem the rising tide of corruption. Consequently, the population has become disheartened; it appears to many that little has changed in the shift from communism to democracy. That disillusionment – felt sharply by the poor, who bear the brunt of economic reform’s “shock therapy” – turned to anger when the Berisha government failed to go to battle. To the poor, democracy and free-market ideals mean little; they have seen only a new group fattened by privilege and wealth gained through corruption. The referendum gave the poor a voice, and they in turn gave the government a loud “no.” The PD, unable to offer another explanation for the defeat, sprang into action to fight corruption. THE OPPOSITION’S EXPLOITATION The opposition, led by the powerful Socialist Party (PS), took advantage of the referendum by turning corruption into a major political issue. The PS is usually quick to exploit for its benefit the Democrats’ political setbacks, but the corruption issue is slightly different. The roots of Albanian corruption are traceable both to the communist era and to the brief period under socialist rule that ended in March 1992. The Socialists, even though their own record regarding corruption is far from clean, are aiming their propaganda guns at the issue in an effort to regain power. The Democrats responded to Socialist attacks by going on the offensive themselves. An article in Rilindja Demokratike, which is run by the PD, berated the “social-communists” for belittling the fight against corruption.1 The daily reported that the Socialists “played the political scene with the card of corruption in the same way they had previously done with the card of class struggle.” The Democrats defended themselves in the article by pointing to some figures in the war against corruption: the State Control Commission fined 510 people a total of 7,713 million lek ($85.7 million), indicted 367 people, and took administrative measures against another 17,177 officials and civil servants. Some say those figures, however, do not paint a true picture. The State Control Commission is accused of failing to act on several cases of blatant corruption. For example, miners at Albania’s largest chrome mine, in Bulqize, staged a hunger strike in late January 1995 to demand the dismissal of the mine director, who they claimed was abusing his power. The commission investigated the mines and reportedly discovered evidence of “large-scale corruption.”2 It supposedly requested the dismissal of the director and the head of the local branch of the Finance Ministry, but no action was taken on that request. That was further evidence of the pervasiveness of corruption, which appears to reach to the highest levels of government, despite constant pledges that it is being fought. The Democrats do not seem to grasp the fact that the population tends to forget or ignore the past and instead concentrate on current events in their lives. This is even more true now, when the gap between the “haves” and “have-nots” is steadily widening and some of the democratic newcomers are becoming visibly richer through their new connections. The Democrats had promised a better life for all and not just for a few; many Albanians are now bitter with resentment. Time may show that Berisha is badly mistaken in his belief that Albania will not follow some other formerly communist countries in bringing socialists back to power. He has said that Albania’s particularly harsh, Stalinist brand of communism makes a return of socialists to power impossible. However, it is possible that the frustration caused by social injustice and corruption could prompt voters to return former communists to rule as they have done in Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria. It has become the Democrats’ custom to explain and justify the country’s many unsolved problems by blaming them all on 50 years of radical communism . While Berisha could be correct in pointing to communism as the root of corruption, placing the sole blame there does not seem to be the right approach. The people are simply tired of listening to the same refrain, which becomes even less convincing when many in central and local government seem only to grow in power or wealth. BERISHA’S LONELY BATTLE President Berisha has been waging the campaign against corruption almost single-handedly. He continues to live modestly, remaining in the same small apartment where he lived before he became president. (He is known, however, to have a penchant for nice clothes.) Observers of the Albanian scene say Berisha is one of the few politicians who have not become rich through political circumstance. But although he stands as a lonely and pious example, Berisha has limited himself to rhetoric, not attempting to tear out the roots of corruption or to fight it within his party and government. When the Albanian voters rejected’the draft constitution, Berisha immediately acknowledged the result as a protest against government inefficiency and corruption, and he praised the people for having shown their anger “in an admirable, democratic manner.”3 At his year-end press conference in late December, he tried to explain the phenomenon of corruption: “Corruption is one of communism’s most bitter legacies; it experienced a great leap forward during the final days of the dictatorship and unfortunately has passed on to the post-dictatorship period. It we look back four or five years, no Albanian could get a refrigerator or a television without first paying for authorization – not to mention getting a job or something else. This unfortunately has remained to this day. Corruption is a serious problem in all newly democratic societies. It is one of the most disturbing problems and must be fought more resolutely.”4 —– 1 Rilindja Demokratike, 28 December 1994. 2 ASD, 3 February 1995. 3 Rilindja Demokratike, 8 November 1994. 4 Rilindja Demakratike, 29 December 1994. The defeat of the referendum had several repercussions. On 4 December 1994, Berisha reshuffled the cabinet, a move that will very likely be followed by other high-level realignments throughout 1995 in anticipation of the national elections, expected in 1996. Although some of the ministers in question were not specifically fired on corruption charges, it was clear that they had been cast from their posts precisely for that reason. Even under the present conditions of democracy, corruption remains as much a way of life in Albania as it was under communism. As Berisha noted, in the past, no one could buy major appliances without a bribe: today, no one can even pay bills for water, electricity, or other services without first bribing an official. To get decent medical care, either private or state-supported, people must pay substantial bribes.5 While some consider this merely an aberration – an irritation of living in present-day Albania – it nevertheless causes great frustration. But far more serious is the corruption at the highest levels of power and administration, which has caused even more bitterness and anger. HIGH-LEVEL ACCUSATIONS The political climate in Albania has become heated over the last few months. The government prosecuted many cases both directly and indirectly related to corruption, all in an arena of open media. The press freely reported and commented on the various scandals, bringing the issue into the public eye. It was during this time that a case referred to as the “Arsidi scandal” returned to court. Former Prime Minister Vilson Ahmeti was tried for the second time, together with former Trade Bank director Agron Saliu and his deputy Agim Tartari, for misappropriating $1.2 million. They allegedly paid that money in 1991 to Nicola Arsidi, a French citizen who was authorized by previous and present administrations to negotiate forgiveness of Albania’s foreign debt (which is estimated to be more than $1.1 billion.)6 Those government leaders had already been sentenced to between two and seven years in prison on the charges, but their appeal to a higher court won them a retrial on the basis of new evidence. That new evidence also implicated former National Bank governor Ilir Hoti and another former Trade Bank director, Ardian Xhyheri. The government has also accused former Deputy Prime Minister Rexhep Uka and former Finance Minister Gene Ruli of abuse of office and corruption in connection with the export of walnut wood by the timber company Elbasan. Former Trade Minister Artan Hoxha was also accused of abusing his position. Ruli and Uka are presently parliament deputies, and on 16 March, legislators voted 63 to 44 against lifting their immunity.7 The 29-year-old Hoxha is currently in Italy doing postgraduate work. Former Transport and Communications Minister Fatos Bitincka and Albert Gajo, an adviser to Prime Minister Aleksander Meksi, have also been accused of falsifying documents and abusing their power.8 In mid-January, the state prosecuted an Albanian legislator for the first time – Democrat Arben Lika, who was charged with cigarette smuggling. That trial, which Supreme Court Chief Justice Zef Brozi is presiding over, has been covered extensively by the press. At least one reporter has written that “the trial may be problematic for many of Lika’s former colleagues, meaning that they might be involved in their own shady dealings. When five PD deputies demanded in January that the chief justice’s immunity be lifted so he could be arrested for abusing his power, the news hit the country like a bolt of lightning. Brozi, a PD member, had been nominated by Berisha as chief justice in an effort to stamp out corruption in the judiciary. Rumor had it that Brozi felt betrayed and abandoned by the president. Some PD deputies reportedly wanted him out because he insisted on prosecuting those guilty of corruption, regardless of party affiliation. The five deputies accused Brozi of illegally approving an early release from jail of a Greek citizen convicted on drug charges. The accusation, however, was clearly politically motivated. Brozi publicly denied any wrongdoing, saying, ‘The record of my struggle against corruption in Albania precludes the possibility of me being corrupt.”10 In fact, Brozi has won high praise for his fight to keep Albania’s courts independent and free from the dictates of politics. He claims – and many believe him – that some corrupt, high-ranking Democrats who fear judicial independence are bent on destroying him. The clash between Brozi and Minister of Internal Affairs Agron Musaraj – whom Brozi has accused of ”directing a mafia network and employing despotic methods against arrested people” – is also interesting in this context.11 On 1 February, the Albanian parliament voted 53 to 49 not to lift Brozi’s immunity. The decision was seen as a smashing victory for the chief justice and another political setback for the PD.12 Brozi said after the vote, “The era when votes were dictated has been replaced by an era when everyone can vote according to his own conviction and conscience.” Brozi also thanked journalists for their support.13 The Brozi case clearly displays the internal battles and divisions within the PD, likely caused by widespread corruption at the highest seats of power, that sooner or later arc bound to wreak political havoc. The incident, however, could positively affect President Berisha’s political fortunes if he can muster enough strength and support from the party to disable the politically and economically corrupt, as he did with the cabinet reshuffle in December. PARTY SPLIT? In addition to the falling electoral support manifested by the referendum defeat, Berisha could be equally threatened by a potential split within his party. The close parliamentary vote against lifting Brozi’s immunity is an indication that members have different agendas. Another sign is the sacking of PD leader Eduard Selami at an extraordinary party congress on 5 March, when 607 of the 664 participants voted against him in an open ballot. That was in the wake of Selami’s threat in late January to resign and his subsequent demand that the constitution be adopted by parliament instead of through a referendum. Selami said the party chief should also be prime minister, a statement interpreted as an effort to unseat Meksi, the present government leader. He also said the government was making a mistake by “not listening to the voice of the party,” adding that there was a “gap between the government and the PD, and the government in power must carry out the party’s policies.”14 All these developments are in one way or another related to the disease of corruption plaguing the country. A rift appears to have divided the party into two main groups: the forces fighting the party’s involvement in corruption, and those who are now trying to survive accusations. Whatever happens, there is relatively little time left before the scheduled national elections in 1996, and this period will be a trying time for Berisha. If the Democratic Party – or whatever is left of it – fails to reinvig-orate itself under Berisha’s charismatic leadership, it could prove disastrous for the president’s political future. —– 5 Interviews by the author in Albania. 6 Gazeta Shqiptare and Aleanca, 10 January 1995. 7 Gazeta Shqiptare, 17 March 1995. 8 Koha Jone, 30 December 1994. 9 Populli Po, 12 January 1995. 10 Zeri, 18 January 1995. 11 Koha, 11 January 1995. 12 Gazeta Shqiptare, 2 February 1995. 13 Rilindja, 4 February 1995. 14 Gazeta Shqiptare, 31 January 1995. http://www.tol.org/client/article/3069-albania Fun Facts About Our New Allies [2]

 

The Progressive Review (Washington), 22 June 1999 “Albania … offered NATO and the U.S. an important military outpost in the turbulent southern Balkans (in the 1990-96 period Albania opened its ports and airstrips for U.S. military use and housed CIA spy planes for flights over Bosnia)…. The U.S. played a major role in the DP’s 1992 electoral victory, and it then provided the new government with military, economic, and political support. In the 1991-96 period Washington directly provided Albania $236 million in economic aid, making the U.S. the second largest bilateral economic donor (following Italy)…..Following Berisha’s visit to the U.S. in March 1991, Washington began supplying direct assistance to the DP, including donations of computers and cars for the 1992 electoral campaign. William Ryerson, the first U.S. ambassador, stood next to Berisha on the podium at election rallies. The U.S. failed to criticize, and at times encouraged, the new president as he purged critics of his policies within the judicial system, police, and the DP—often through illegal means. By 1993 DP loyalists and family members held most of the prominent positions in Albania’s ministries, institutes, universities, and state media. Citing the threat of communism’s return, Berisha successfully instilled fear in the population and discredited his rivals. The U.S. embassy in Albania contributed to the polarization of Albanian politics by refusing to meet most of the opposition parties (former communists as well as others) for the first two years of DP rule. This one-sided view of democratization helped Berisha dismantle most political alternatives, some of which were moderate and truly democratic.

Uwe. G. Kranz, Ltd. Ministerialrat, Organisierte Kriminalität und Terrorismus – eine kritisch

Europäischer Polizeikongress, Berlin,14.02.2007, http://www.euro-police.com/pdf/kranz_2007.pdf

20 Jahre Staats Terror der Salih Berisha Bande: Der neue Report des US Department of State Report

Gary Kokalari: Er nennt Salih Berisha: einen gnadenlosen, pathologischer Lügner! Berisha Gaddafi Berisha, 100 mal schlimmer als Gaddafi