Man erfindet einfach dann eine Unabhängigkeits Erklärung, welche angeblich in Archiven in Rom liegt. Albanische Historiker berichten über dieses Mysterium der angeblichen Unabhängigkeits Erklärung! Die Albanische Presse und Fachleute,zum Mysterium der „Unabhängigkeits Erklärung“, welche erst in der Enver Hoxha Zeit, zusammen gebastelt wurde. Ab 1937, bastelte ein Herrn Noli an der Geschichte und stellte sich selber in Mittel Punkt, obwohl die Militär Fakten, eine ganz Andere ist ab 1910-12. Ein Kolonial Krieg, praktisch gegen das Osmanische Reich, war auch in Albanien entbrannt. Die Batterie des Holländers Colonel Thomsen, spielt eine grosse Rolle dabei, u.a. die Landungs Stelle Durres (damals noch ohne Hafen und fast keine Einwohner Zahl) zu sichern, wo heute das Königs Schloss und Mafia Appartment Häuser sind.
Historischer Müll, zu 100% erfunden und in der Enver Hoxha Zeit ausgebaut, inklusive der Erfindung der Illyrier Abstammung, welche noch unsinniger ist.
Vice Chairman of the European Parlament for South East Europa Victor Bostinaru: Berisha must changeNach der Organisierung, von Schmuggel aller Art, ist der Grundstücks Raub, Bebauung, Vernichtung der Wälder an der Küste, Terroristischer Raub, der Öffentlichen Strände durch den Bau von Lokalen der Polizei Banden aus Tropoje und Kukes vor allem, die einzige Tätigkeit oft von den derzeitigen Polizei Chefs in Albanien. Hinzu kommt 100% Terrorismus gegen die wenigen Touristischen Investoren, durch Nichts Tun! oder wollen sie Bestechungsgeld, für Aktion?Alles normal in Albanien: Die Polizei Chefs, leiten die grossen Schmuggler Operationen, was an 2004 erinnert, als diverse Polizei Chef, Anti Mafia Chefs in Skhoder und Vlore, den Menschenschmuggel organisierten und wo 29 Menschen ertranken.
siehe die Mord an dem Anti Mafia Chef des Geheimdiensten in Durres: Iso Copa, Morde an hohen Polizisten in Durres usw..! Immer dabei Polizei Offiziere. Wie immer wurde der fiktive Export mit Hilfe der Durres Mafia abgewickelt, im Hafen von Durres, was als Folklore der Durres Mafia und Tradition zusehen ist. Das Öl wurde illegal mit Tankwagen nach Durres gebracht und dort über Mafia Tankstellen, wie von „Kastrioti“ / „Taci“ usw., oder dem Mafia Zentral Punkt, mit Tankstelle: Lokal – Hotel Aragosta verkauft. Deshalb haben soviele Politiker, eigene Tankstellen, was sowieso jeder vor 10 Jahren auch schon wusste.
Polizei ist Mafia in Albanien, seitdem auch noch der Berufs Ganove Lulzim Basha, Innenminister wurde.
Neben Schmuggel aller Art
In Durres, Sarande, Vlore, wüten auch die Tropoje, Kukes Polizei Direktoren Banden, welche nur für ihre privaten Geschäfte, mit der Mafia Zeit haben und für den Terroristischen Bau ihrer Clans und Freunde, auf den Öffentlichen Stränden und Parks. Reine Banditen Primitiv Clans, 100 mal krimineller als Sonstwas! Öl schmuggel und Betrug, durch den Chef der Anti Schmuggler Brigande in Vlore flog auf, aber sowas ist normal. Oil, Interior Ministry under investigation 30/11/2011 19:45
Among the main defendants there is Iliaz Fisheku, adminsitrator of Fisheku Jsc, accused by the prosecution over fraud. The head of the Maritime Anti-smuggling Unit in Vlore, Arian Daci, is accused of power abuse and falsification of documents.
Dashamir Kasa is accused of power abuse, and the four drivers who were arrested and then released, will be charged for failing to report a crime. The same charges will be on Nikollaq Llozli and Fatmir Kaja.
THe investigations for the Vergine Oil started on October 2010 and the 13 main suspects were arrested on March 2010. All of them were released, mostly for health reasons.
The Vergine Oil export scheme allowed 20.000 tons of oil to be exported fictively, with containers that went to Durres. In documents it was written as if the load had passed the Vlore Port and was exported with the Ritas and Calitea ships, when it was in fact sold in the inner market, by defrauding the Albanian citizens.
Gangster Boss: Hajri Elezaj mit anderen Namen unterwegs, wie es im Balkan Tradition ist.
Der Öl Skandal, führt rund um Zoll- und Pantsch Betrug, in immer neue Tiefen. Die Methodik, ist seit praktisch 20 Jahren bekannt, inklusive der Öl – Versorgung mit dem Serbischen Geheimdienst, während dem UN-Öl Embargo vor allem rund um Salih Berisha Leute, wie Fatmir Mediu, Azem Hajdari, oder Agron Musaraj. Weil jeder Ganove in Albanien, oft Adminstrative ebenso, ja Abgeordnete sogar, mehrere Idenditäten hat, konnte auch ein Herr Elezaj verschwinden, denn er hat einen guten Freund: u.a. Agron Kulicaj(Freund Arian Caki, Qualifikation: Verbrecher) Italienischen Mafia, hat man ja die besten und alten Partnerschaften.
Nachdem der sogenannte Geschäftsmann Hajri Elezaj, enger Partner der Salih Berisha Verbrecher Kartelle, nach einem Haus Arrest, spurlos verschwand, weiten sich die Ermittlungen aus. Vor allem wird in der Amtszeit der Non-Stop Skandale des Lulzim Basha und des sogenanntes Wirtschafts Ministerium (9 leitende Direktoren des Wirtschafts Ministerium wurden festgenommen ), ermittelt. Bereits bei Amts Antritt war jedem Fachmann klar, das Lulzim Basha, die Albanische Polizei vollkommen ruinieren wird. Grund war ganz einfach, das viele sogenannte Politiker nur ihren Betrugs Geschäften nachgehen und fast immer inkompetent und vollkommen korrupt sind.
Direkt vom Serbischen Geheimdienst Chef zur Verfügung gestellt, der ohne einen Pass vorzuzeigen durch die Pass Kontrolle in Rhinas damals in 1994-1995 marschieren konnte, weil er dieses Schwarzen Cadillac (Foto aus 2009 / Durres, inzwischen wurde er abgewrackt), mit Fahrer dem Innenminister Agron Musaraj zur Verfügung stellte, der dann 1997, zur Prostituierten Transporten zum Hotel Florida u.a. genutzt wurde, rund um die Familie Hasanbeliu, Ben Hasani, heute in Fake hohen Adminstrations Posten erneut in der Mafia Regierung (u.a. Umwelt Ministerium weil man ja mit Minister Fatmir Mediu, damals Geschäfte machte)
Salih Berisha, Alexander Meksi, Azem Hajdari, Baskhim Kopliku, Agron Musaraj, schmuggelten halfen Milosovic bei den Balkan Kriegen ganz entscheidend, als sie für 750 Millionen $ (unversteuertes Öl) nach Serbien schmuggelten.
Legendärer überlanger Lincoln Cadillac, für den Albanischen Innenminister Agron Musaraj, aus dem Hause des Salih Berisha, bezahlt mit Fahrer direkt vom Serbischen Geheimdienst Chef, der sehr gut Deutsch ebenso sprach und der ohne Ausweis Kontrolle am Flugplatz Rhinas durch die Sperren ging und allgemein bekannt war, als Geschäfts Partner des Salih Berisha und Freunde in 1994, als das Treibstoff Embargo in Kraft trat.
Back Ground zur Albaner Mafia, umFormer Minister of Interior Agron Musaraj (1993-1996)
Korrupte Richter und Staatsanwälte, ebenso inkompetent, auch Nichts Neues. Die Bürgermeister, Präfekten, Richter, Notare, Anwälte, Stadt Verwaltungen bis hin zum Justiz Minister: kennen keine Gesetze, wollen keine erlernen und ignorieren jede Art von Logik sogar. HCJ finds six irregular judges 30/11/2011
Six judges from different courts were found irregular, after an inspection of the High Council of Justice.
The Vice Chairman of this Council, Kreshnik Spahiu, sent the inspection report to the Ministry of Justice, which has the exclusive right to make concrete proposals for the disciplinary measures that need to be taken, or for discharging the judges who have been found with irregularities. The proposals will be reviewed and approved by the majority of the HCJ members.
For the moment, the names of the six judges are not made public and neither the courts where they work. Sources at the High Council of justice say that the inspectors of this council will continue the surprise inspections at the First Degree Courts and Courts of Appeal. http://www.top-channel.tv/english/artikull.php?id=3844&ref=fp
3 Post Angestellte, wurden in Vlore verhaftet.
Vlorë, arrestohen 3 punonjës të postës për shpërdorim detyre
VLORE- Tre punonjës të postës janë vënë në ranga nga policia e Vlorës për veprat penale vjedhje e kryer duke shpërdoruar detyrën dhe falsifikim dokumentesh. Arrestimi i tyre është bërë në kuadër të operacionit të koduar Postieri, pas një hetimi dy mujor.
Policia e Vlorës deklaron se, Bazuar në provat e mbledhura është bërë i mundur fillimi i procedimit penal dhe ndalimi i shtetasve: Yllka Gjondeda 55-vjec, punonjëse e zyrës postare, me funksion karteliste, Bernard Haxhiaj 24-vjec punonjës në zyrën postare të komunës Sevaster, Osman Sulaj 42-vjec, punonjës i zyrës postare në komunën Vllahinë.(ma.ar/BalkanWb)
TI, Albanien ist korrupter als in 2010, wo es auch schon extrem schlimm war, und belegt mit der Gangster Republik Kosovo die letzten Plätze, im Null Funktion Staat, krimineller Volks Terroristen und Banditen.
TIRANE- Transparency International Albania ka publikuar sot indeksin për korrupsionin në vendet e rajonit, ku Shqipëria renditet e parafundit, duke lënë pas vetëm Kosovën.
Sipas TIA, vendi ynë ka bërë hapa prapa për sa i përket korrupsionit, krahasuar me vitin 2010-të.
Këtë vit Shqipëria renditet e9 5-ta në listën e indeksit global të perceptimit të korrupsionit, ndër 183 shtete të botës, 8 vende më poshtë se në 2010-ën. TIA theksoi se Shqipëria ka marrë një vlerësim prej 3.1 pikësh nga 3.3 pikë që ka qënë në vitin 2010. Kjo do të thotë se të gjitha vendet e rajonit, përvec Kosovës kanë tregues më të mirë se vendi ynë.
„Llogaritja e indeksit për Shqipërinë është realizuar nga 7 institucione të pavarura nëpërmjet 8 burimeve të dhënash: Fondacioni Bertelsmann, Njësia e Inteligjencës Ekonomike (Economic Intelligence Unit), Global Insight, Freedom House, Guida Ndërkombëtare e Vendeve sipas Riskut (International Country Risk Guide), Forumi Ekonomik Botëror (World Economic Forum), dhe Projekti i Drejtësisë Botërore (World Justice Project).Në rajonin e Evropës Jug-Lindore, vërehet një përkeqësim i dukshëm në vendet e Ballkanit Perëndimor; me përjashtim të Malit të Zi që ka patur rritje në pikë (nga 3.7 në 4) me 3 shkallë klasifikimi; duke arritur rezultat të njëjtë me Kroacinë e cila ka pësuar rënie të lehtë në klasifikim. Ndërkohë që vendi i parë në rajon vazhdon t`i përkasë Turqisë me notën 4.2 duke u renditur e 61-ta në klasifikim“, sqarohet nga TIA.Transparency International Albania i rekomandon qeverisë të ketë në axhendën e saj betejën antikorrupsion një kusht ky edhe për integrimin në BE.(ma.ar/BalkanWeb)
Geschäfts Modell der Albaner Mafia: Mord an Geschäftspartnern und Ehepartnern
Stabelweise merkwürdige Tode, angebliche Selbstmord und Herz Attaken, ein Marken Zeichen der Albaner Mafia, welche ihre eigenen Verwandten, Ehefrauen, Ehemänner ermordet um an das Vermögen zukommen. Besonders beliebt auch als Joint Venture Modell, weil man ja jeden Vertrag, durch eine Null Justiz und vollkommen korrupt, uminterpretieren und Straflos umfälschen kann, was wie im Kononi Fall, direkt sogar in die Staats Archive geht, wo Dokumente ausgetauscht werden, oder Beweis Mittel aus Gerichten verschwinden, durch „Unbekannte“, welche an Hand der Finger Abdrücke, als Personen nicht zum Gericht gehörend identifiziert werden. 3 Herz Infarkt Botschafter gibt es in den letzten Jahren, welche wohl zuviel wussten und mit den falschen Personen sprachen und Einladungen annahmen. Bekannt sind die Morde an Deutschen vor allem in Tirana, u.a. durch die Dritan Celaj Mafia und Co. und rund um den Visa Handel der Deutschen Mafia Diplomaten vor 2005. siehe BKA Bericht zum Thema.
Saturday, December 3, 2011
Tirana,„suicide,“thedirector of thehypermarket„Carrefour„
This detailed account first published in 1998 by former UN Military Observer Carlos Martino Branco casts serious doubt on the decision of The Appeals Chamber of the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) that genocide was committed in Srebrenica in 1995.
Was Srebenica a hoax?
It is now two years since the Muslim enclave, Srebenica, fell into the hands of the Serbian army in Bosnia. Much has been written about the matter. Nonetheless the majority of reports have been limited to a broad media exposure of the event, with very little analytic rigor.
Discussion of Srebrenica cannot be limited to genocide and mass graves.
A rigorous analysis of the events must take into consideration the background circumstances, in order to understand the real motives which led to the fall of the enclave.
The zone of Srebrenica, like almost all of Eastern Bosnia, is characterized by very rugged terrain. Steep valleys with dense forests and deep ravines make it impossible for combat vehicles to pass, and offers a clear advantage to defensive forces. Given the resources available to both parties, and the characteristics of the terrain, it would seem that the Bosnian army (ABiH) had the necessary force to defend itself, if it had used full advantage of the terrain. This, however, did not occur.
Given the military advantage of the defensive forces it is very difficult to explain the absence of military resistance. The Muslim forces did not establish an effective defensive system and did not even try to take advantage of their heavy artillery, under control of the United Nations (UN) forces, at a time in which they had every reason to do so.
The lack of a military response stands in clear contrast to the offensive attitude which characterized the actions of the defensive forces in previous siege situations, which typically launched violent raids against the Serbian villages surrounding the enclave, thus provoking heavy casualties amongst the Serbian civilian population.
But in this instance, with the attention of the media focused upon the area, military defence of the enclave would have revealed the true situation in security zones, and demonstrate that these had never been genuinely demilitarized zones as was claimed, but were harboured highly-armed military units. Military resistance would jeopardize the image of victim, which had been so carefully constructed, and which the Muslims considered vital to maintain.
Throughout the entire operation, it was clear that there were profound disagreements between the leaders of the enclave. From a military viewpoint, there was total confusion. Oric, the charismatic commander of Srebenica, was absent.
The Sarajevo government did not authorize his return in order to lead the resistance. Military power fell into the hands of his lieutenants, who had a long history of incompatibility. The absence of Orics clear leadership led to a situation of total ineptitude. The contradictory orders of his successors completely paralyzed the forces under siege.
The behavior of the political leaders is also interesting. The local SDP president, Zlatko Dukic, in an interview with European Union observers, explained that Srebrenica formed part of a business transaction which involved a logistical support route to Sarajevo, via Vogosca.
He also claimed that the fall of the enclave formed part of an orchestrated campaign to discredit the West and win the support of Islamic countries. This was the reason for Oric to maintain a distance from his troops. This thesis was also defended by the local supporters of the DAS. There were also many rumours of a trade within the local population of the enclave.
Another curious aspect was the absence of a military reaction from the 2nd Corps of the Muslim army, which did nothing to relieve the military pressure on the enclave. It was common knowledge that the Serbian unit in the region, the Drina Corps, was exhausted and that the attack on Srebenica was only possible with the aid of the units from other regions. Despite this fact, Sarajevo did not lift a finger in order to launch an attack which would have divided the Serbian forces and exposed the vulnerabilities created by the concentration of resources around Srebenica. Such an attack would have reduced the military pressure on the enclave.
It is also important to register the pathetic appeal of the president of Opstina, Osman Suljic, on July 9, which implored military observers to say to the world that the Serbians were using chemical weapons. The same gentleman later accused the media of transmitting false news items on the resistance of troops in the enclave, requiring a denial from the UN. According to Suljic, the Muslim troops did not respond, and would never respond with heavy artillery fire. Simultaneously, he complained of the lack of food supplies and of the humanitarian situation. Curiously, observers were never allowed to inspect the food reserve deposits. The emphasis given by political leaders on the lack of military response and the absence of food provisions loosely suggests an official policy which began to be discernible.
In mid 1995, the prolongation of the war had dampened public interest. There had been a substantial reduction in the pressure of public opinion in the western democracies. An incident of this importance would nonetheless provide hot news material for the media during several weeks, could awaken public opinion and incite new passions. In this manner it would be possible to kill two birds with one stone: pressure could be laid to bear in order to lift the embargo and simultaneously the occupying countries would find it difficult to withdraw their forces, a hypothesis which had been advanced by leading UN figures such as Akashi and Boutros-Boutros Ghali.
The Muslims always harbored a secret hope that the embargo would be lifted. This had become the prime objective of the Sarajevo government, and had been fuelled by the vote in the US Senate and Congress in favor of such a measure. President Clinton, however, vetoed the decision and required a two thirds majority in both houses. The enclaves collapse gave the decisive push that the campaign needed. After its fall, the US Senate voted with over a two thirds majority in favor of lifting the embargo.
It was clear that sooner or later the enclaves would fall into the hands of the Serbians, it was an inevitability. There was a consensus amongst the negotiators (the US administration, the UN and European governments) that it was impossible to maintain the three Muslim enclaves, and that they should be exchanged for territories in Central Bosnia. Madeleine Albright suggested this exchange on numerous occasions to Izetbegovic, based on the proposals of the Contact Group.
As early as 1993, at the time of the first crisis of the enclave, Karadzic had proposed to Izetbgovic to exchange Srebrenica for the suburb of Vogosca. This exchange included the movement of populations in both directions. This was the purpose of secret negotiations in order to avoid undesirable publicity. This implied that the western countries accepted and encouraged ethnic separation.
The truth is that both the Americans and President Izetbegovic had tacitly agreed that it made no sense to insist in maintaining these isolated enclaves in a divided Bosnia. In 1995 nobody believed any longer in the inevitability of ethnic division of the territory. In the month of June 1995, before the military operation in Srebrenica, Alexander Vershbow, Special Assistant to President Clinton stated that America should encourage the Bosnians to think in terms of territories with greater territorial coherence and compactness. In other words this meant that the enclaves should be forgotten. The attack on Srebrenica, with no help from Belgrade, was completely unnecessary and proved to be one of the most significant examples of the political failure of the Serbian leadership.
Meanwhile the western media exacerbated the situation by transforming the enclaves into a powerful mass-media icon; a situation which Izetbegovic was quick to explore. CNN had daily broadcasts of the images of mass graves for thousands of corpses, obtained from spy satellites. Despite the microscopic precision in the localization of these graves, it is certain that no discovery to date has confirmed such suspicions. Since there are no longer restrictions on movement, we inevitably speculate on why they have still not been shown to the world.
If there had been a premeditated plan of genocide, instead of attacking in only one direction, from the south to the north – which left the hypothesis to escape to the north and west, the Serbs would have established a siege in order to ensure that no one escaped. The UN observation posts to the north of the enclave were never disturbed and remained in activity after the end of the military operations. There are obviously mass graves in the outskirts of Srebrenica as in the rest of ex-Yugoslavia where combat has occurred, but there are no grounds for the campaign which was mounted, nor the numbers advanced by CNN.
The mass graves are filled by a limited number of corpses from both sides, the consequence of heated battle and combat and not the result of a premeditated plan of genocide, as occurred against the Serbian populations in Krajina, in the Summer of 1995, when the Croatian army implemented the mass murder of all Serbians found there. In this instance, the media maintained an absolute silence, despite the fact that the genocide occurred over a three month period. The objective of Srebrenica was ethnic cleansing and not genocide, unlike what happened in Krajina, in which although there was no military action, the Croatian army decimated villages.
Despite knowledge of the fact that the enclaves were already a lost cause, Sarajevo insisted in drawing political dividends from the fact. The receptivity which had been created in the eyes of public opinion made it easier to sell the thesis of genocide.
But of even greater importance than the genocide thesis and the political isolation of the Serbs, was blackmailing of the UN: either the UN joined forces with the Sarajevo government in the conflict (which subsequently happened) or the UN would be completely discredited in the eyes of the public, leading in turn to support for Bosnia. Srebrenica was the last straw which led western governments to reach agreement on the need to cease their neutrality and commence a military action against one side in the conflict. It was the last straw which united the West in their desire to break Serbian bestiality. Sarajevo was conscious of the fact that it lacked the military capacity to defeat the Serbs. It was necessary to create conditions via which the international community could do this for them. Srebrenica played a vital role in this process.
Srebrenica represents one of a series of acts by the Serbian leaders intended to provoke the UN, in order to demonstrate their impotence. This was a serious strategic error which would cost them dear. The side which had everything to win by demonstrating the impotence of the UN was the Sarajevo leadership and not that of Pale. In 1995 it was clear that the change in the status quo required a powerful intervention which would overthrow the Serbian military power. Srebrenica was one of the pretexts, resulting from the short-sightedness of the Bosnian Serbian leaders.
The besieged forces could have easily defended the enclave, at least for much longer, if they had been well led. It proved convenient to let the enclave fall in this manner. Since the enclave was doomed to fall, it was preferable to let this happen in the most beneficial manner possible. But this would only have been viable if Sarajevo had political initiative and freedom of movement, which would never occur at the negotiating table. The deliberate fall of the enclave might appear to be an act of terrible machiavellian orchestration, but the truth is that the Sarajevo government had much to gain, as proved to be the case. Srebrenica was not a zero-sum game. The Serbians won a military victory but with highly negative political side-effects, which helped result in their definitive ostracization.
We might add a final curious note. As the UN observation posts were attacked, and proved impossible to maintain, the forces withdrew. The barricades set up by the Muslim army did not let the troops past. These troops were not treated as soldiers fleeing from the front line, but rather with a sordid differentiation.
The Muslims not only refused to fight to defend themselves, they forced others to fight on their behalf. In one instance, the commander of a Dutch vehicle decided after conversations with ABiH to pass the barrier. A Muslim soldier threw a hand grenade whose fragments mortally wounded him. The only UN soldier to die in the Srebrenica offensive, was killed by the Muslims.
Carlos Martins Branco teaches at the European University Institute, Department of Social and Political Sciences, Badia Fiesolana, Italy
„Srebrenica: A Town Betrayed“ follows interviews and revelations by Bosnian-Muslim investigative journalist Mirsad Fazlic, who doesnt appreciate the fictitious, black-and-white version of the Bosnian war that is perpetuated by the international community and by Bosnian officialdom, which still honors wartime president Alija Izetbegovic as a national hero when Fazlic and others know he was the opposite. The film really begins only at the four-minute mark, and its main shortcoming is the ubiquitous, stubborn marriage to the notion that the number 7-8,000 killed is anything other than a concoction that the world has been working backwards for 16 years to make seem real.
Among numerous of the films jaw-dropping revelations including the fact that the humanitarian convoys which the Serbs were allowing to pass to Srebrenica were being intercepted by Bosnian hero Naser Oric and sold on the black market (and including Srebrenica police chief Hakija Mehovic describing the meeting at which the Bosnian leadership floated a proposal by Bill Clinton that 5,000 Srebrenica residents be sacrificed) are the following:
1. Mladic had four tanks and 400 men. In reserve he also had 1600 armed locals. But Mladic didnt trust them since they lacked discipline and would use every opportunity to revenge [Srebrenica warlord] Orics attacks on the villages. The Serbs were outgunned by NATOs fighter aircraft, 450 Dutch peacekeepers and Orics 5,500 soldiers. (The first fact is important as a contradistinction to the Mladic that has been presented to the public, and there is more in the film in that regard. The latter factoids are important to illustrate that Srebrenica was set up for the Serbs to overpower, with the Muslim side winning by losing, as Nebojsa Malic calls it.)
2. In reference to the 50 Serbian villages that were being attacked by the Muslims of Srebrenica: Especially disturbing was a religious dimension to the killings. Men were castrated in an anti-Christian gesture of circumcision. Pregnant women were disemboweled with cuts in the form of a cross. Some people were crucified, nails driven through their hands.
3. In April 1993 military chiefs from both sides General Sefer Halilovic and General Ratko Mladic signed a UN plan for Srebrenica and the other cities to become demilitarized zones. The Muslims promised on their side to stop the aggression against the Serbs around the enclaves and against the 15,000 Serbs still living in the capital Sarajevo. (The Muslim side naturally didnt hold to their end of the bargain, but what makes the excerpt exceptional is the word aggression for once attributed to the correct side of the Bosnian war.)
4. Islam will win, since Bosnia is an Islamic country. (Graffiti on the walls of a destroyed building in Kravica, where on January 7, 1993 Orthodox Christmas Muslims destroyed the town, killing 49 men, women, and children.)
Double standard!? „It is quite incredible that Islam fundamentalists are terrorists only when they kill the Americans, and that they are noble champions of justice when they shoot innocent citizens of Yugoslavia“ says Yugoslav Minister.
USAID = CIA und der intelligenteste Chef, der Moslem Brüderschaft bestätigt diese Information nun. Ansonsten ist Al-Quida nur eine Erfindugn des US Geheimdienstes und US Statedepartment, was historisch schon u.a. durch beste Quellen bewiesen ist. So kann man den Billiarden schweren Drogen Schmuggel, die Produktion und Verteilung auch für die Geldwäsche in den US Banken, wie City Bank und American Bank, tarnen. siehe u.a. UN Reports usw.. und rund um die Iran Contra Affäre.
Albanian Secret Service Chief Fatos Klosi in 16.5.1998 in der Albania durch den Albanischen Geheimdienst Chef Fatos Klosi: KLA (UCK) is financed by Bin Laden
Foreign Intelligence Services Have Information For Connection Of Ex-Leader Of Army For Kosovo Liberation Hasim Taqi With Osama Bin Laden Belgrade, February 11, 2002 Foreign intelligence services, including the US one, have information for the connections of the ex-leader of the Army for Kosovo Liberation /AKL/ Hasim Taqi with Osama bin Laden, the todays edition of Glas javnosti daily says. The
ex-chief of the Albanian National Intelligence Service Fatos Klosi
confirmed bin Laden has been in Albania in the 90-ies where he had
organized training camps for the AKL fighters.
The candidate for President of Kosovo and leader of the Democratic
Union of Kosovo Ibrahim Rugova also has information in regard of the
connections of Taqi with bin Laden. After the announcement of the
election results Rugova promised to make public the evidences for the terrorist activity of its political opponent.
The friendship between Taqi and bin laden has begun in 1996.
According to the sources of the daily, in the period 1996-2001 bin
Laden has invested some USD 200 M in activities, related to different
criminal deals in Kosovo. http://www.southeasteurope.org
Der Türkische Geheimdienst MIT, der verstorbene Italienische Staatspräsident Cossiga, bestätigten alle das Al-Quida eine Erfindung der US Geheimdienste ist: der beste Feind ist der Feind, den es nicht gibt!
Kurz vor seinem frühen Tod sagte der britische Aussenminister Robin Cook dem Parlament, dass Al Kaida nicht wirklich eine Terrorgruppe sei, sondern eine Datenbank von internationalen Freiheitskämpfern Mujaheddin und Waffenschmugglern die von der CIA ausgewählt, geführt, ausgebildet und finanziert wurde, um Kämpfer, Waffen und Geld in das von der Sowjetunion besetzte Afghanistan zu schleusen.
Hier ein Bericht aus dem indischen Journal World Affairs, in dem der Geheimagent des Französischen Militärs Pierre-Henri Bunel von seinen Erfahrungen erzählt, welche die Aussage von Robin Cook bestätigt:
Das erste Mal habe ich von Al Qaida (Deutsch Al-Kaida) gehört als ich einen Führungs- und Offizierskurs in Jordanien besuchte.
CRISIS IN THE BALKANS: THE SEPARATISTS; Leaders of Kosovo Rebels Tied to Deadly Power Play
By CHRIS HEDGES Published: June 25, 1999
The campaign, in which as many as half a dozen top rebel commanders were shot dead, was directed by Hashim Thaci and two of his lieutenants, Azem Syla and Xhavit Haliti (NATO secret report), these officials said. Mr. Thaci denied through a spokesman that he had been responsible for any such killings.
Remembering the beginning of fighting more than a year ago, Rifat Haxhijaj, 30, a former lieutenant in the Yugoslav Army who left the rebel movement last September and now lives in Switzerland, said: “When the war started, everyone wanted to be the chief. For the leadership this was never just a war against Serbs — it was also a struggle for power.“
Mr. Thaci’s representative in Switzerland, Jashae Salihu, denied accounts of assassinations. “These kind of reports are untrue,“ he said. “Neither Mr. Thaci nor anyone else from the K.L.A. is involved in this kind of activity. Our goal has been to establish a free Kosovo and nothing more.“
The charges of assassinations and purges were made in interviews with about a dozen former and current Kosovo Liberation Army officials, two of whom said they had witnessed executions of Mr. Thaci’s rivals; a former senior diplomat for the Albanian Government; a former police official in the Albanian Government who worked with the rebel group, and several Western diplomats.
Hashim Thaci was only 31 years old when he became the indispensable partner of the NATO in Kosovo. Six years ago, former leader of the controversial Kosovo Liberation Army converted himself into a presentable politician as leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo. Now he is the main opponent of Ibrahim Rugova. The man of extraordinary times tries hard to become the man of ordinary times
Born to be wild
Hashim Thaci was born on the 24th of April, 1968 in Brocna in municipality of Srbica (northwest of Drenica valley). According to his brief profile published in Kosovo Assembly web site, Thaci studied philosophy and history (in the University of Pristina), and then attended postgraduate studies in the University of Zurich, in history of Southeast Europe and international relations departments. According to other less official sources however, he was not a student model
A certain Beqir Osmani from Drenica remembers well the youth of Thaci: We know well who he is. We know what he did, how he was in school and what kind of education he received. Everyone on the Kosovska Mitrovica market had great problems with Thaci, who stole goods from traders. Even the customers complained. He fought in pubs of Mitrovica and Srbica. He has no education at all. He only attended two first classes of a certain secondary school. Today however he meets with international politicians. What he can actually discuss with them is far from being clear.
Serbian officials however know him from more honourable deed than commonplace thefts and quarrels in public areas.
During his university years, Thaci was one of the Albanian student leaders, and the first student president of the parallel university in Pristina. Kosovo Albanians, full of resentment over the 1989 annulment of the autonomy of Kosovo by Slobodan Milosevic, established in early 1990s underground administrative and educational institutions.
By 1993, in Switzerland, Thaci joined the Kosovo Albanian political emigration. He was one of the founders of the Marxist-Leninist organisation People’s Movement of Kosovo, which is believed to have created the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK).
From 1993, as a member of the inner circle of the UCK, Thaci alias Snake (Gjarpni) was responsible for securing financial means, training and armament. After he completed his military training in Albania, he was engaged in a number of terrorist actions in Kosovo.
Thaci is also known as the organiser of the Drenica-Group. The group controlled between 10-15 per cent of criminal activities in Kosovo in connection with smuggling of arms, stolen cars, oil and cigarettes as well as with prostitution, the establishment and maintenance of connections with the Albanian, Czech and Macedonian mafia. Other than that, Thacis sister is married to Sejdija Bajrush, one of the leaders of the notorious Albanian mafia.
On the 25th of May, 1993, Thaci, along with the Drenica-Group members Rafet Rama, Jakup Nuri, Sami Ljustku and Ilijaz Kadriju, participated in the attack on the railroad crossing in Glogovac (central Kosovo) when four Serbian policemen were killed and three seriously wounded. Thereafter, according to the deposition of Rafet Rama on the 11th July, 1997 in the District Court of Pristina, Thaci and others went into hiding in wood in Drenica. Yet, they often visited Albania, Switzerland and Kosovo.
On the 17th of June, 1996, Thaci with other accomplices opened fire on a Serbian police car on the road Mitrovica-Pec in Sipolje (north of Kosovo). Same year, according to the deposition of Rama, Thaci and his gang threw hand grenades into the Serbian barracks Milos Obilic in Vucitrn (central Kosovo). In July 1997, Thaci was sentenced, in absentia, by the District Court of Pristina to 10 years in prison for criminal acts of terrorism. In February 1998, a central arrest warrant was issued in his name. Thaci was condemned for having ambushed and attacked patrolling Serbian policemen.
Wrath of Thaci not only fell upon Serbian officials, but Albanian dissidents as well. Chris Hedges from New York Times accused Hashim Thaci and his two confidents, Azem Syla the UCKs Minister of Defence and Xhavit Haliti the Ambassador to Albania, of murdering top commanders within the UCK itself and other potentially opponent Kosovo Albanian nationalists (Leaders of Kosovo Rebels Tied to Deadly Power Play, 25 June 1999). Hedges interviewed for his article a former member of the secessionist movement in Switzerland, Rifat Haxhijaj, who stated: When the war [against Serb authority] started, everyone wanted to be the chief. For the leadership this was never just a war against Serbs – it was also a struggle for power. In 1997, a Kosovo Albanian reporter, Ali Uka, who was a supporter of the Kosovo independence movement though too critical for the taste of its leadership, was found dead in his apartment in Tirana. His roommate at the time of his death was no other than Thaci the Snake. According to former UCK officials, Thaci conducted assassinations in cooperation with Tirana, which often placed members of its secret police at the disposal of the rebel commanders.
According to Bujar Bukoshi, once the Prime Minister of the Rugova government in exile, Cadavers have never been an obstacle to Thacis career.
In 1995, following the Dayton Accord, which putting an end to the Yugoslavia War did not mention at all the Kosovo problem, Kosovo Albanians began to lose their faith in Ibrahim Rugova and his passive resistance strategy. There must be some other way to fight against Serbians. That way was the UCK, which claimed for the first time in February 1996 the assault to a Serbian refugees camp in Bosnia. In January 1997, Serbian rector of the University of Pristina was seriously wounded by a trapped car. The perpetrator was again the UCK.
In 1997, on 28th of November, the symbolic day of the Independence of Albanian people, during the funeral of a teacher killed by Serbian soldiers in Ludovic (central Kosovo), the UCK made its first public appearance. After Serbian forces killed 53 members of the Adem Jeshari family in Drenica in March 1998, because they suspected Jeshari of being a UCK leader, suddenly tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanians, who had used to support Rugova’s passive resistance, transferred their loyalty and took up arms with the UCK. In February 1998, the Serbian police and the Yugoslavian Army entered Kosovo, destroyed many villages and caused 2000 of victims and the flight of 250.000 refugees. From April until September, there were serious quarrels between Yugoslavian troops and the UCK. The second Kosovo war began. On the 15th of May, 1998, Rugova smiled at cameras as he shook the hand of Milosevic in Belgrade. The day of the UCK was finally there
However during the summer offensive of the Yugoslavian Army, the UCK had to endure serious military reverses. The man, who helped its reorganisation, was Thaci.
On the 13th of October, Richard Holbrook, American negotiator and Milosevic signed an accord. Milosevic conceded the retreat of Serbian forces, the ceasefire and the arrival of 2000 unarmed controllers of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Three days after, the accord was categorically rejected by the UCK. Quarrels resumed. The UCK bade that fight bring more.
And it did. By the autumn of 1998, Milosevic was not the man of the Dayton Accord anymore. Serbia launched the winter offensive, which started by Christmas night and culminated with the massacre of Racak where 45 Albanians were killed as revenge for the actions that the UCK undertook against Serbian security forces. The Western world found the evil of the story: Milosevic and Serbians.
By the autumn 1998, the language of the UCK changed as well. It was not the Marxist-Leninist movement of old times anymore. The UCK also revised its plans of Greater Albania since it saw what a deploring political and social situation welcomed Kosovo Albanian refugees in Albania. The UCK turned its initial ideal of Greater Albania into Greater Kosovo, though skilfully hid its dream from the international community. The Western world found the good of the story: the UCK and Kosovo Albanians. The year of 1999 was to change the fate of the UCK as well as that of Hashim Thaci, now political leader of the Army, for good.
Why decorate the bandit with sheriff badge?
What a change it was. Only two years ago, the Western world called the UCK extreme or terrorist and condemned its acts as criminal, only comparable to those of the Red Khmers, who massacred their own people in Cambodia. The CIA added the UCK on the list of world terrorist organisations.
In less than a year, the UCK was promoted from a terrorist organisation to a resistance movement. And its new political leader, 31-year old Hashim Thaci, was going to gather the fruits of that sudden change in Western attitude.
Ibrahim Rugova, who denied even the existence of the UCK or at the best denounced it as Serbian secret services trick, did not want to be a mere witness of the unpreventable ascension of Hashim Thaci. In fact, the ultimate pacifist did what no one could have ever dreamt of him. By summer 1998, a certain Ahmet Krasniqi, a former colonel in the Yugoslavian Army, was given $4.5 million by Rugovas administration in order to establish a rival military structure: the Armed Forces of the Kosovo Republic (FARK). Tension between the UCK and the FARK did not last for long. According to the New York Times columnist, on the 21st of September, Krasniqi was eliminated by the UCK or by Albanian secret police or both in Tirana.
Hashim Thaci, as head of the Albanian delegation, was invited to Rambouillet pour parleys in Paris on the 6th of February, 1999. Rugova was there only to witness his own decline. Thaci stubbornly refused to accept the Western proposition for the autonomy of Kosovo. Negotiations resumed on the 19th and ended with the ratification of the accord by the UCK on the 23rd. The document was a turning point. First of all, it meant the international recognition for the UCK. It foresaw an interim government of Kosovo including the three major parties: the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) of Rugova, the United Democratic League (LBD) allied with the UCK and of course the UCK itself. And the Prime Minister was going to be Hashim Thaci. The document also promised a referendum, which would however never take place.
On the 24th of March, the NATO started bombing former Yugoslavia. During the intervention, the UCK became a kind of land troops of General Wesley Clark, supreme commander of NATO forces. After all, that was necessary: Who else but the UCK would have known better the land and pinpointed vital military targets to NATO planes to bomb? Yet the NATO chose to co-operate with a highly suspect and unpredictable partner.
After 78-day NATO bombing, by June 1999, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) and the UN Mission (UNMIK) entered Kosovo. Hashim Thaci, self-proclaimed Prime Minister of Kosovo was triumphant. Madeleine Albright is in love with Thaci. Jamie Rubin is his best friend. It’s not helpful. Thaci arrived here with the impression that he has the full weight of the American government behind him. He believes he has earned the right to rule, stated the first head of the UNMIK, Sergio Vieira de Mello. The UCK celebrated the victory everywhere in Kosovo as if the NATO did nothing for it. Albanian houses and official buildings were decorated with UCK banners. Unlike Rugova, Thaci was everywhere in Kosovo to take care of his fellow Albanians.
However, Serbian officials denounce still today that because of Thacis UCK, targets, which were far from being military, were bombed by the NATO and left Yugoslavian territories ravaged with several civil victims. In March 2000, the Voice of Russia accused the UCK of built-in tension. According to the radio, in December 1998, the UCK deliberately killed four Serbian policemen in Racak (central Kosovo) in order to provoke Serbian forces to retaliation. The radio went on that Serbian forces did not kill 45 Albanian farmers but UCK soldiers. The UCK, deceiving the international community, tried to prepare the field for the NATO aggression on Yugoslavia. Serbia insisted that its forces made some gruesome discoveries when they liberated the town of Klecka (south of Pristina) in August 1998. The NATO, proud of having prevented Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, after June 1999, found itself accused of supporting Albanian counter-cleansing against Serbians and Roma Gypsies.
Gracko was a Serbian village not far from Pristina, surrounded by Albanian villages and controlled by UCK forces. On the 23rd of July, 14 Serbian farmers while harvesting their crops were killed by UCK soldiers, according to Gracko inhabitants. Thaci condemned the assault and denied any responsibility. The incident took place six weeks after the NATO entry in Kosovo and only one month after the signature of the Undertaking of Demilitarisation and Transformation of the UCK between Thaci and British General Mike Jackson, head of the KFOR. Ironically many of the Gracko inhabitants were Serbian refugees from Bosnia and Krajina region of Croatia. Those, who were allegedly expelled by troops under the command of General Ante Gotovina who is currently at The Hague to answer the allegations against him. The difference, if not numerical (150 victims to 14), must be political. The NATO, which showed Serbians as the evil of the story and thus justified its intervention on international platform, could not accept that its closest partner was not that angelic after all. This would have annulled the legitimacy of its own intervention.
The fatal mistake was that the international community reduced the conflict of Kosovo to a black-and-white mentality with angelic figures on one hand and demonic figures on the other. However the Balkans as a whole is abundant of grey zones. History itself can testify.
It is still claimed that during his premiership, Thaci used former UCK soldiers in elimination of his political opponents, in creating an ethnically pure Kosovo forcing Serbians to live in enclaves. Thaci thought differently of the newly formed Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), mainly formed by ex-UCK men. The KPC, in theory a civil guard, was to become the official Kosovo Army. Pleurat Sejdiu, former UCK representative to London, suggested that the UCK was ordering its regional commanders not to entirely decommission its ranks. Serbians denounced Thaci for organised prostitution, narcotics and arms traffic. Thaci allegedly conducted his political campaigns and fed Albanian terrorist groups by those means.
However the visible face of Thaci was totally different. On the 8th of March, 1999, the pragmatic hard-liner founded the Party for the Democratic Progress of Kosovo, later the Democratic Party of Kosovo (DPK). The party program was not different from that of Rugovas LDP: Social, political and economic development, amelioration of health care and education, security and of course full independence of Kosovo. The DPK was supposed to gather those, who were disappointed with rugovism. What Thaci did not count with was that there were also those, who were disappointed with thacism. Some ex-UCK men found Thacis new line too soft. January and February 2000 saw the birth of two new UCK-designed Albanian guerrillas: the National Liberation Army of Macedonia in northwest of Macedonia and the Liberation Army of Presevo-Medvedja-Bujanovac in southwest of Serbia. Those former UCK-cells were to be engaged in insurgencies in Presevo Valley in Serbia (2000) and in Macedonia (2001). In March 2000, Ramush Haradinaj, ex-UCK commandant, left the DPK to found his own Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK). It is claimed that Haradinajs entry on political scene was sponsored by Britain and the USA in order to split the UCK base. Haradinaj was also the deputy Commander of the KPC.
As to Kosovo Albanians, they were tired of insecure atmosphere, which marked the Thaci period. In four months only, the OSCE reported 348 murders, 116 kidnappings, 1070 lootings and 1106 arsons. After June 1999, the UCK and then the DPK imposed their own candidates as local authorities. Some of them however were incompetent for their posts. Kosovo Albanians showed their dissatisfaction with the DPK in the 28th of October 2000 municipal elections, which was a great blow for the Party. It must also be remembered that on the 5th of October, Milosevic was replaced by democrat Vojislav Kostunica in Serbia. Serbian threat did not exist anymore. On the 15th of December, 1999, a Provisional Administrative Council of Kosovo (PAVK), which ended Thacis interim government, was founded. The PAVK was supposed to be a big coalition between the LDK and the DPK. Rugova and his Bukoshi government boycotted it for some time. However Thaci did always venerate Rugova as an honourable rival.
He should venerate him. After a period of disillusionment with Rugova, despite his meeting with Milosevic and his inexplicable absence in Kosovo until 2000, Kosovo Albanians faithfully turned once again to their pacifist President. In fact, Kosovo Albanians were confused: in villages, it was common to hear them chanting „UCK, UCK!“ and then „Rugova, Rugova!“ and „NATO, NATO!“ feeling no contradiction in supporting all of their liberators. Rugovas legitimacy vis-à-vis Thacis was irrefutable: two times he was officially elected President. Thaci was never legitimated by elections. Kosovo Albanians wanted to have two trumps though opposite at the same time at hand: moderate Rugova and radical Thaci. On the 29th of June, 2000, the Agreement on Understanding was signed between Bernard Kouchner, head of the UNMIK and Artemije, Episcope of Raska-Prizren (Sandzak). Serbian Episcope, who accused Thaci of hypocrisy and of trying to create a mono-ethnic Kosovo, obtained the legalisation of Serbian enclaves and the participation of a Serbian delegation in PAVK meetings. Following PAVK meetings were boycotted by Thaci, who thereafter decided to freeze of his Party’s participation in joint administrative structures: The territorial integrity of Kosovo had been and is still being violated. KFOR and UNMIK were unwilling to resolve problems. Mitrovica [north of Kosovo], which was the originator of enclaves, is still divided while no discussion is allowed within PAVK about this or any other problem and question which requires swift action. As to Rugova, he declared that he accepted the Agreement just because he considered it as temporary. Those reactions were typical of them.
From that date on until March 2004, relations between Thaci and the UNMIK deteriorated. Key powers retained by the UNMIK (defence, justice, foreign policy), the Constitutional Framework of April 2001 defined which powers the provisional institutions of self-government (PISG) could wield. In the 17th of November 2001 elections, the DPK obtained 25.7 per cent of the vote and obtained 26 seats in the Assembly. Thacis DPK entered the big coalition as the second big party after the LDK. Prime Minister was the most moderate member of the DPK, the man famous for having defused ethnic tensions in divided town of Mitrovica, Bajram Rexhepi. Thaci was relentless on full independence and asked more power for the PISG. However now that Serbian pressure attenuated, more grave and immediate problems were on agenda. Kosovo is still one of Europes poorest regions. More than a half of its people live in poverty. The average salary of those, who work, is 200 Euros per month. According to official statistics, the unemployment rate is 57.1 per cent, while more than 70 per cent of the youth aged 16-24 are unemployed.
In April 2002, the UNMIK proclaimed standards before status policy to defer independence pressure. Failure to define Kosovos status and premature donor withdrawal turned reconstruction boom into recession in 2003. In the 23rd of October 2004 elections, the DPK, with 30 seats in the Assembly, consigned to opposition. After two-day riots in March 2004, which ended with 19 dead and 900 wounded, Kosovo Albanians were looking for peace and stability.
Hashim Thaci continues to be an unpredictable figure. In October 2005, with his insistence on a resolution of independence, which would be adopted in the Assembly to clarify its position rejecting any kind of negotiations or dialogue with Belgrade, he caused a major crisis with the UNMIK, which granted no authority to the PISG to proclaim independence.
By the end of November, when the final status negotiations finally started, Thaci published a noteworthy article in International Herald Tribune (25.11.2005): Perhaps the best incentive for all of us is for the European Union to admit Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro as three independent countries who have implemented the same standards of democratic development, minority protections and economic safeguards, under the umbrella of NATO. In this way, the entire region can be demilitarized with open borders, a free flow of people, goods and services, strong rule of law, and a vibrant economy with a common currency that unites our various communities. Then and only then will the hatreds and conflicts of the past be truly consigned to collective memory and not resurrected in the experience of each successive generation. However, Thaci has a red-line. He is against Belgrades option cantonisation: It did not work in Bosnia and it will not work in Kosovo. I am more ambitious for my country. His ambition is decentralisation, not based on ethnic divisions – a proposition held by the UNMIK as well since March 2004 riots. One problem though: Thaci refuses to discuss decentralisation issue during the status negotiations since the reformation of local power is an issue, which concerns Kosovo institutions. Although other members of the Albanian status negotiating team unanimously stated that decentralisation couldn’t be part of the talks, one may wonder if Thacis unpredictable temper may change the course of history. Since 1995, there is a new Albanian movement called Vetevendosje (self determination) in Kosovo guided by a 30-year old former student leader and political prisoner Albin Kurti, who reminds of Thaci of old times: relentless, determined (though non violent). Famous American Balkan specialist, Tim Judah wrote then with right: If at a crucial point in talks, one of the Albanian parties – for example, the DPK of former guerrilla leader Hashim Thaci – decides to swing his support behind Kurti then the outcome of talks, especially if a wave of anti-Serbian ethnic cleansing similar to that of March 2004 also breaks out again, cannot be predicted.
Yet this threatening possibility may be exactly what the West wants to use as a trump against the Serbian delegation. With a stick-and-carrot strategy (Rugova as carrot and Thaci as stick), the West would make Serbians accept what they thought unacceptable before for fear of the worst.
The CIA and Albanian intelligence recruit an informer knowledgeable about al-Qaeda in the Balkans. The informer, whose name is Hassan Mustafa Osama Nasr, but is known as Abu Omar, is recruited by a special unit of the Albanian National Intelligence Service (ShIK) created at the behest of the CIA. An officer in the unit, Astrit Nasufi, will say that the unit is actually run by a CIA agent known as Mike who is based on the US embassy in Tirana, Albania, and who teaches them intelligence techniques. The CIA and ShIK are worried about a possible assassination attempt against the Egyptian foreign minister, who is to visit Albania soon, so about twelve radical Egyptians, members of Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya and Islamic Jihad, are detained beforehand. Nasr is not on the list, but is detained because of a link to a suspect charity, the Human Relief and Construction Agency (HRCA). He is held for about 10 days and, although he initially refuses to talk, ShIK has a full file on him after a week. He provides information about around ten fellow Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya members working for HRCA and two other charities, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society, both of which will be declared designated supporters of terrorism after 9/11. However, he says there are no plans to kill the Egyptian foreign minister, as this would mean Albania would no longer be a safe haven for fundamentalist Muslims. The intelligence Nasr goes on to provide is regarded as good quality and includes the identities of operatives monitoring the US embassy and entering and leaving Albania. The CIA is most interested in monitoring former mujaheddin joining the Bosnian Muslims, and Nasr also provides intelligence on Al-Gamaa al-Islamiyya branches in Britain, Germany, and Italy, in particular the Islamic Cultural Institute in Milan, which is a base for mujaheddin operations in the Balkans and is raided by the Italian government around this time (see Late 1993-December 14, 1995). Even though cooperation appears to be good, after a few weeks Nasr suddenly disappears and the CIA tells ShIK that Nasr has moved to Germany. [Chicago Tribune, 7/2/2005] Nasr will later surface in Italy and will become close to Islamic militants in Milan (see Summer 2000), but will be kidnapped by the CIA after 9/11 (see Noon February 17, 2003).
„… the Albanian security situation reflects the volatility of the clan-based rivalries and the related narco-trafficking and criminal activities which are linked with global terrorism. But by admitting this as the basis for the need to move [US] facilities out of Albania, the US would then have to admit that this terrorism-related criminal activity, and particularly narco-trafficking, is intrinsically linked into the al-Qaida and Iranian-backed terrorist infrastructure of the region, and into the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which now, under new names, controls the Serbian province of Kosovo…. no-one in the State Department or Defense Department is willing to admit that US support for this terrorist and narco-trafficking base of Albanians in 1999 — when the US led NATO into attacks on Serbia in order to assist the KLA — was wrong. This is part of the distortion of US foreign and strategic policy: no-one will admit that they made a mistake. There are many Congressmen on Capitol Hill who understand that this distortion exists with regard to Balkan policy. But equally, there are politicians in both major parties who supported the KLA during the 1990s, so that today it is impossible for a Republican-controlled Bush White House and Congress to attack the logic and merit of the 1999 war, waged against Serbia by the then-Democratic Party-controlled Clinton White House. It is difficult for the White House, for example, to criticize the 1990s support by the Clinton Administration for the al-Qaida -linked KLA without also opening up to criticism some senior members of the Republican Party….. The fact that the US has been forced to remove its assets from Albania, despite the quiet manner in which this has been undertaken, is just one indication of the ongoing degradation of the situation there. And yet the US still refuses to acknowledge that this is integrally linked with the Albanian-based terrorism underway in the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, or that it is at the very heart of the creation of what is already a criminal sub-state in Kosovo, which is directly under the control of the KLA….“
Special Report; US Policy in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean: Time to Stop Choosing Sides, and to Start Choosing Strategic Interests Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, 13 April 2005
„The Clinton administration followed up by providing strong support to the KLA, even though it was known that the KLA supported the Muslim mujahadeen. Despite that knowledge, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright had the KLA removed from the State Department list of terrorists. This action paved the way for the United States to provide the KLA with needed logistical support. At the same time, the KLA also received support from Iran and Usama bin Laden, along with ‚Islamic holy warriors‘ who were jihad veterans from Bosnia, Chechnya and Afghanistan. Swiss journalist Richard Labeviere, in his book, ‚Dollars for Terror,‘ said that the international Islamic networks linked to bin Laden received help from U.S. intelligence community. Indeed, Chechen sources claim that U.S. intelligence also aided them in their opposition to Russia. Given that U.S. policy in the post-Cold War period has not only been anti-Russian but anti-Iranian, the United States worked closely with Pakistan’s predominantly Sunni Inter-Services Intelligence organization. Through ISI, the United States recruited Sunni mujahadeen by staging them in Chechnya to fight in Bosnia and later in Kosovo.“ F.Michael Maloof, former Pentagon Counterterrorism Adviser
STRASBOURG Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci was one of the key players in the traffic of organs of Serb prisoners after the 1998-99 conflict there, according to allegations in a draft Council of Europe report. The report, by Swiss Council of Europe deputy Dick Marty, accuses Thaci and other senior commanders of the ethnic Albanian guerrilla group the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) of having s…
If we are to judge by individual reactions of countries that responded to Kosovos declaration of independence, everybody has their own interests but what is missing from global media reports dedicated to the precedents and separatism is terrorism, which was a constituent factor in creating the worlds newest nation. Great Serbia and Great Albania two sides of the same coin The fate of the i…
Hashim Thaci was only 31 years old when he became the indispensable partner of the NATO in Kosovo. Six years ago, former leader of the controversial Kosovo Liberation Army converted himself into a presentable politician as leader of the Democratic Party of Kosovo. Now he is the main opponent of Ibrahim Rugova. The man of extraordinary times tries hard to become the man of ordinary times Born to…
The presence of the radical Islam in K&M [Kosovo and Metohija] is illustrated by the fact that in 1995 Osama Bin Laden visited Albania as a guest of Sali Berisha, who was the President of Albania at the time, when bases for the logistic and financial support to the Al Khaida organization were set up, with cells in K&M. In addition to Bin Laden, the meeting was attended by Bashkim Gazideda, for…
Al Qaeda in Iraq operative killed near Syrian border sheds light on foreign influence
By Bill RoggioOctober 3, 2007 10:50 AM
Senior al Qaeda in Iraq leaders killed in September 2007. Image courtesy of MNF-I. Click to view.
The US military has long maintained that al Qaeda in Iraq is led by foreign al Qaeda. Over the past year, senior al Qaeda operatives such as Omar Farouq, one of Osama bin Ladens lieutenants and al Qaedas operations chief in Southeast Asia, and Abd al-Hadi al-Iraqi, one of bin Ladens senior deputies who was personally chosen by bin Laden to monitor al Qaeda operations in Iraq, have been captured inside Iraq. Al Qaeda in Iraqs leader, Abu Ayyub al Masri, is an Egyptian selected by al Qaeda Central. Al Masri was a close aide to Ayman al Zawahiri, and was a member of Zawahiris Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Its prior leader, Abu Musab al Zarqawi, was an experienced al Qaeda operative of Jordanian origin. Much of al Qaeda in Iraqs senior leadership is of foreign origin.
eration Army (KLA), with links to Osama binLaden. The neocons thought they were s
ion Army (KLA), with links to Osama binLaden. The neocons thought they were support
targeted by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), also known by the acronym UCK. These
r the past 10 years Ayman al-Zawahiri [binLaden’s second in command] has operat
e past 10 years Ayman al-Zawahiri [binLaden’s second in command] has operated ter
had a high position with our terrorist KLA allies? And who wants to bring up wha
The Times report gets even better:
Klosi said he believed terrorists had already infiltrated other parts of Europe from bases in Albania. Interpol believes more than 100,000 blank Albanian passports were stolen in riots last year, providing ample opportunity for terrorists to acquire false papers.
Americans are in the crosshairs of terrorists worldwide purely due to Washington’s policy in the Muslim world, not because there is an Islamic enemy whose only aim is to kill Americans for their freedoms and lifestyle, insists a former CIA officer. Historian Michael Scheuer, an author of „Through our enemies‘ eyes“, who worked for the agency for over 20 years till 2004 and at one time was the chief of the CIA’s ‚Bin Laden unit‘, says America’s greatest enemy — radical Islam — never existed: neither when Bin Laden was alive, nor now.