Infos

Sie befinden sich aktuell in den Balkanforum Balkanblog.org Blog-Archiven für den folgenden Tag 16.2.2007.

Februar 2007
M D M D F S S
    Mrz »
 1234
567891011
12131415161718
19202122232425
262728  
Links

Archive für 16.2.2007

Janes: US TACKLES ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN KOSOVO

The Articles:

1. Jane’s Intelligence Review

February 1, 1995

SECTION: EUROPE; Vol. 7; No. 2; Pg. 68

The ‘Balkan Medellin’

BYLINE: Marko Milivojevic

Introduction

The Albanian-dominated region of western Macedonia accounts for a disproportionate share of the Macedonia’s (FYROM) shrinking GDP. This situation has strengthened Albanophobic sentiments among the ethnic Macedonian majority, especially as a great deal of revenue is thought to derive from Albanian narco-terrorism as well as associated gun-running and cross-border smuggling to and from Albania, Bulgaria and the Kosovo province of Serbia. Although its extent and forms remain in dispute, this rising Albanian economic power is helping to turn the Balkans into a hub of criminality.

Albanian Narco-Terrorism

Previously transported to Western Europe through former Yugoslavia, heroin from Turkey, the Transcaucasus and points further east is now being increasingly routed to Italy via the Black Sea, Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia. This is a development that has strengthened the Albanian mafia which is now thought to control 70 per cent of the illegal heroin market in Germany and Switzerland. Closely allied to the powerful Sicilian mafia, the Albanian associates have also greatly benefitted from the presence of large numbers of mainly Kosovar Albanians in a number of West European countries; Switzerland alone now has over 100000 ethnic Albanian residents. As well as providing a perfect cover for Albanian criminals, this diaspora is also a useful source of income for racketeers.

Socially organized in extended families bound together in clan alliances, Kosovar Albanians dominate the Albanian mafia in the southern Balkans. Other than Kosovo, the Albanian mafia is also active in northern Albania and western Macedonia. In this context, the so-called ‘Balkan Medellin’ is made up of a number of geographically connected border towns, namely Veliki Trnovac and Blastica in Serbia, Vratnica in Macedonia, and Gostivar in Albania. Further afield, the Albanian mafia also has a strong presence in: Pristina, the capital of Kosovo; Skopje, the capital of Macedonia; Shkoder, the second largest city in Albania and its northern provincial capital; and Durres, Albania’s main port and maritime link to nearby Italy across the Adriatic Sea.

As for heroin processing locally, the Albanian mafia now reportedly runs at least two secret facilities in Macedonia, which is also the key regional transportation crossroads for the trans-shipment of heroin from Bulgaria to Albania. Heroin shipments are thought to be mostly moved overland by a number of seemingly legitimate international trucking and freight-forwarding companies in Albania, Bulgaria and Macedonia.

High-level corruption, widespread local poverty, a tradition of cross-border smuggling and poor policing throughout the region have all aided the recent rise of the Albanian mafia. In Macedonia, local drug-trafficking is now out of control, a fact which no doubt explains why the Macedonian police have recently turned to Italy for assistance in this area of law enforcement. In this context, the Italian national police mounted a major 10-month joint operation with their Macedonian counterparts in Skopje in 1993-94. Codenamed ‘Macedonia’, this operation reportedly involved intensive surveillance of known Kosovar Albanian drug-traffickers in the Macedonian capital. Here, a joint Italian-Macedonian police swoop resulted in the seizure of 42 kg of pure heroin in May 1994. In terms of the quantity of heroin now routinely transiting Macedonia, however, the Skopje seizure was insignificant. Operationally, larger seizures of such controlled substances are ultimately dependent on co-operation from the police in nearby Serbia and Albania. To date, they have proved remarkably unhelpful.

If left unchecked, this growing Albanian narco-terrorism could lead to a Colombian syndrome in the southern Balkans, or the emergence of a situation in which the Albanian mafia becomes powerful enough to control one or more states in the region. In practical terms, this will involve either Albania or Macedonia, or both. Politically, this is now being done by channelling growing foreign exchange (forex) profits from narco-terrorism into local governments and political parties. In Albania, the ruling Democratic Party (DP) led by President Sali Berisha is now widely suspected of tacitly tolerating and even directly profiting from drug-trafficking for wider politico-economic reasons, namely the financing of secessionist political parties and other groupings in Kosovo and Macedonia.

In Macedonia, the Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP) and other ethnic Albanian political parties, such as the ultra-nationalistic National Democratic Party (NDP), are almost certainly in receipt of laundered Albanian forex profits from narco-terrorism. These have also been reportedly used for the bribing of corrupt Macedonian government officials and police. More generally, Kosovo and western Macedonia are both suspiciously well endowed in forex. This can only realistically have come from criminal enterprises, given the widespread poverty of these two connected areas in the Yugoslav period.

A similar state of affairs exists in nearby Albania, which is not as poor in forex as its government likes to pretend. In all three cases, this criminally generated forex is often disguised as emigree remittances; these totalled over US$500 million in Albania alone in 1993. If Kosovo and Macedonia are included, then total Albanian forex from narco-terrorism going into the southern Balkans in 1993 could have been as high as US$1 billion. Other than buying the Albanian mafia political protection and influence, and a certain spurious popular legitimacy for its alleged patriotism, this laundered drug money is now being increasingly used in an associated activity, namely gun-running among the region’s ethnic Albanians.

Balkan Arms Bazaar

Bizarre even by the murky standards of the Balkans, the recent trial in Skopje of 10 ethnic Albanians charged with ‘conspiracy to form military formations’ revealed the extent of illegal gun-running at the highest levels in Macedonia. Politically, what made this trial significant was the public standing of some of its defendants. In this context, the then Macedonian interior minister, Ljubomir Frckovski, ordered the arrest in late 1993 of two leading members of the PDP, which was in government in Skopje. The two alleged high-level gun-runners were Midhat Emini, the then president of the PDP, and Husein Haskaj, the then deputy defence minister in the government of Premier Branko Crvenkovski. Given the immense political implications of these arrests and the trial that followed on from them in 1994, Frckovski could only have acted in the way that he did

for the most compelling of reasons.

All of this meant that top PDP leaders were then involved in the illegal importation of armaments purchased in Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia and the West. These activities must have involved the local Albanian mafia, which is itself heavily armed with sophisticated weaponry purchased with the profits from narco-terrorism. This may have indicated that the PDP and the NDP were tiring of parliamentary politics in Skopje and preparing other options to advance their cause, namely an armed uprising of some sort. In the case of the main ethnic Albanian political party in Macedonia, the PDP, this interpretation was later given added credence when its formally relatively moderate leadership was ousted by a radical ultra-nationalist faction in a palace revolution orchestrated by the DP government in Albania. Significantly, this development took place just after the public trial of the two top PDP leaders charged with illegal gun-running.

Currently led by two noted ultra-nationalists, Abdurahman Haliti and Medhuh Thaci, the PDP can thus no longer be regarded as a purely constitutional party. In practice, it is also a secret party-militia, tainted with Albanian narco-terrorist connections. This is even more true of the NDP which is now close to becoming a terrorist organization. In addition, both these parties are now also directly controlled by nearby Albania where the SHIK secret police is known to be heavily implicated in both working with the Albanian mafia and cross-border gun-running into Macedonia and Kosovo. For all these reasons, the PDP and the NDP may eventually be formally proscribed by the Skopje government.

Despite its recent poor performance in the October 1994 elections (see article on pp 64-67), the VMRO-DPMNE aims to profit from such worsening inter-ethnic tensions in the future. Already, it is openly advocating the use of repressive and violent options against the ethnic Albanian minority. In this context, the VMRO-DPMNE is itself suspected of secretly arming its ultra-nationalistic membership with the assistance of influential VMRO irredentist forces in nearby Bulgaria. Sofia has a notorious reputation for selling armaments to anybody who can pay for them, including virtually all the parties in the ongoing civil war in the former Yugoslavia.

Regional Sanctions Breaking

Effectively trapped between two stronger anti-Macedonian states, namely Serbia and Greece, Macedonia has effectively been compelled to break the trade embargo imposed by the UN against rump Yugoslavia in 1992. In the case of Serbia, Macedonia was closely bound to it economically during the Yugoslav period. Breaking all these economic links, as demanded by the UN Security Council, has proved impossible in practice.

Initially tolerated by the international community, the Macedonian sanctions-breaking has recently reached significant levels, particularly after the UN lifted some of its non-economic sanctions

against rump Yugoslavia in 1994. For all practical purposes, there is no longer even the pretence of Macedonian compliance with the UN’s sanctions regime against rump Yugoslavia. Other than Greece, Albania and Bulgaria also reportedly make extensive use of Macedonia for their own sanctions-breaking activities in relation to rump Yugoslavia. Economically, it is now an open secret in Skopje that Macedonia would have completely collapsed long ago had it attempted to avoid such regional sanctions-busting.

In this context, matters became critical for Macedonia when Greece, in a move clearly closely co-ordinated with Serbia, imposed an economic blockade against the country in March 1994. This immediately cut off Macedonia from the Greek port of Thessaloniki, thereby increasing its economic dependence on Serbia. The only alternative link to the outside world, via nearby Albania and Bulgaria, was also uncertain. In the case of Albania, this was mainly due to a worsening of relations between Skopje and Tirane over the issue of the ethnic Albanians in western Macedonia.

As regards Bulgaria, there were also political problems, notably those pertaining to Sofia’s ambivalent recognition of Macedonia as a separate Macedonian state but not as the homeland of a separate Macedonian nation distinct from Bulgaria. In addition, the main east-west communications routes to Albania and Bulgaria are very poorly developed, thereby limiting the amount of freight traffic they can handle.

Politically, this illegal Greco-Serbian economic pressure against Macedonia has resulted in a more conciliatory stance by the Skopje government towards Athens and Belgrade. Officials in these capitals would like to see Macedonia reincorporated into a third and Serb-dominated Yugoslavia. Domestically, such a scenario is now being made more probable by local socio-economic collapse and the worsening conflict between the ethnic Macedonian majority and the ethnic Albanian minority population in western Macedonia. Longer term, this could conceivably lead to local participation in a proposed regional anti-Albanian and anti-Muslim ‘Orthodox Alliance’ between Bulgaria, Greece, Macedonia and Serbia. Already openly advocated by VMRO-DPMNE, such a scenario would become more probable if Macedonia descends into an inter-ethnic civil war or outright partition furthered by its stronger and hostile neighbours.

Marko Milivojevic is member of the Research Unit in South East European Studies at the University of Bradford, UK.

 GRAPHIC: Photograph 1, UN soldiers patrol a queue of vehicles which are waiting to be checked for embargoed goods prior to entering Serbia from Macedonia.; (Photograph 2, AP)

* * * *  

2. The Scotsman

November 30, 1998, Monday Pg. 7

US TACKLES ISLAMIC MILITANCY IN KOSOVO

Chris Stephen In Pristina

THE United States has asked Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian rebels to distance themselves from so called Mujahideen fundamentalists, amid reports that Islamic extremists are arriving to fight in this war-torn province.

KLA leaders have accepted the US request, prompted by fears in Washington that the war in Kosovo will provide fertile ground for Muslim fundamentalists to take root.

Fundamentalists are well established in Albania, despite several raids by the CIA and Albanian security forces that seized five key members of Islamic Jihad and other Middle Eastern groups this summer.

Now a joint CIA-Albanian intelligence operation has reported Mujahideen units from at least half a dozen Middle East countries streaming across the border into Kosovo from safe bases in Albania.

The American request came at an October meeting of US envoys with the leaders of the ethnic-Albanian Kosovo Liberation Army at their headquarters in Geneva.

A senior KLA source told The Scotsman that the group agreed to the request: “It’s a clear position; we don’t want anything from these people,” he said. “Even before they (the US) told us to be careful from them, we’d had this firm understanding.”

http://www.siri-us.com/backgrounders/Archives_Kosovo/KLA-Osama.html 

BOOK REVIEW: DICTIONARY OF COLD WAR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

BOOK REVIEW: DICTIONARY OF COLD WAR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

Soviet intelligence agencies “rarely used the polygraph, but
trained some of their officers with a machine stolen in 1965 by
a Counterintelligence Corps sergeant, Glen Rohrer, who defected
to Czechoslovakia.”

That curious factoid is just one of many intriguing nuggets
contained in a new “Historical Dictionary of Cold War
Counterintelligence” by British intelligence writer Nigel West,
which is the sixth in a series of historical intelligence
dictionaries published by Scarecrow Press.

From “abduction” to “Zlatovsky” the new Dictionary provides
brief, capsule summaries of key topics, terms and events in the
turbulent history of cold war counterintelligence.

All of the familiar entries are there, and quite a few unfamiliar
ones.

“White Knuckle” is “the CIA codename for an operation to recover
classified files that had been loaned to the KGB defector
Anatoli Golitsyn to assist his research for the
counterintelligence staff. The documents were retrieved from
his home in New York City, as well as from his mill farm
upstate.”

“Eyewash” is “the CIA term for false entries made in files,
usually to protect the security of a source, often indicating
that a particular target has rejected a pitch, when in fact the
offer was accepted.”

An excellent series of Appendices provide a convenient roster of
espionage prosecutions in the United States; a list of U.S.
defectors to the Soviet Union; a list of Soviet and Eastern bloc
intelligence defectors to the United States; and more.

Part of the satisfaction of reading a book like this derives from
seeking and finding errors, and there are at least a few of
those. There is a “Philip” whose name is misspelled “Phillip.”
More significantly, CIA covert action is not limited to, nor
does it even consist principally of, “paramilitary operations,”
as the Dictionary says.

The entries themselves are not sourced or annotated, so if a
reader wants to pursue further information, he has to take his
best guess as to where it may be found in the bibliography.

Some readers might wish the author had refrained from publishing
speculation about the identities of individuals who he thinks
correspond to spies known only by their Soviet code name. If
the book is mistaken about the “likely” identity of RELAY, for
example, it will have perpetrated an injustice that is difficult
to correct.

Just a few writers have immersed themselves in the historical
intelligence literature as extensively as the prolific Mr. West
and returned to write about it. So almost anyone is likely to
learn something new.

Some of the other volumes in the present series have been found
wanting by Hayden B. Peake, a former intelligence officer and
bibliophile who reviewed them for the CIA journal Studies in
Intelligence. But an earlier volume on British intelligence
that was also written by Mr. West was ruled by Mr. Peake “quite
good,” which is high praise from that quarter.

The very high list price of the book ($115) will make it
unaffordable for many readers and will probably limit its
acquisition to larger libraries and special collections.

More information, including a table of contents and an excerpt,
may be found on the Scarecrow Press (www.scarecrowpress.com)
web site here:

http://tinyurl.com/ypono7

Ist die Kosovo Organisation “Vetëvendosje” eine Terror Organisation?

Experten stufen Albin Kurti und seine Organisation “Vetëvendosje”, als Terroristisch ein. Die Quelle, sind von solchen Berichten im übrigen Professoeren aus verschiedenen Unis. Man kann die Mitglieds Liste ja einsehen.Selbstbestimmung
13.02.2007
BELGRAD/PRISTINA/TIRANA/BERLIN
…………..
Angestiftet wurden die Proteste von einer Organisation mit dem Namen “Vetëvendosje” (Selbstbestimmung), die seit mehreren Jahren für eine Vereinigung des Kosovo mit Albanien und für den Anschluss von Teilen Mazedoniens, Montenegros und Griechenlands kämpft. Als Modell für die aktuellen Unruhen gelten die kosovarischen Aufstände vom März 2004, bei denen mindestens 18 Menschen ums Leben kamen und mehrere Kirchen und Klöster der serbischen Orthodoxie verwüstet wurden - mit Erfolg: Über die damaligen Aufstandsplanungen waren zwar Kritikern zufolge deutsche Geheimdienst- und Militärkreise bereits im Vorhinein informiert; die Unruhen wurden jedoch von den Besatzungstruppen nicht verhindert und lieferten der Berliner Außenpolitik den Anlass, auf eine baldige Sezession der südserbischen Provinz zu drängen.[2]
Herumgereicht
Die Organisation Vetëvendosje, die von Experten als terroristisch eingestuft wird, verlangt den sofortigen Abbruch der Sezessionsverhandlungen und die unmittelbare Gründung eines Staates Kosovo. “Schlagt die Serben” und “Freiheit, keine Standards” lauten ihre zentralen Parolen, berichtet ein langjähriger Beobachter [3]; mit “Standards” ist auch der von der UNO verlangte Schutz von Minderheiten vor mörderischen Pogromen gemeint. Vetëvendosje bewegt sich im Umfeld von Veteranen der Vereinigung “Balli Kombëtar”, einer früheren Terrororganisation des großalbanischen Nationalismus, die zu Beginn der 1940er Jahre mit NS-Deutschland kollaborierte. Vetëvendosje-Chef Albin Kurti verfügt über Kontakte nach Deutschland; er nutzte sie, um seine einflussreiche Position in der kosovarischen Sezessionsbewegung zu sichern. Als Repräsentant der Untergrundarmee UCK wurde er während der Vorbereitung des Jugoslawien-Krieges “in der ganzen westlichen Welt als ‘charismatischer Studentenführer’ herumgereicht”, berichtet ein damaliger deutscher Regierungsberater.[4] Zu Kurtis Kontaktpersonen gehörte auch der frühere Außenminister Klaus Kinkel.
Vorstöße
Kurtis Deutschland-Kontakte konnten im Dunstkreis der langjährigen Unterstützung gedeihen, die das deutsche Geheimdienstmilieu der UCK zukommen ließ. Entsprechende “Vorstöße in den albanischen Raum” begannen bereits Ende der 1980er Jahre. Nach Auskunft des Geheimdienstexperten Erich Schmidt-Eenboom leitete der damalige deutsche Außenminister Hans-Dietrich Genscher diese Kontaktsuche an.[5] Ziel war es, den Zusammenbruch der Warschauer Pakt-Staaten zu nutzen und rasch an den Grenzen des damaligen Jugoslawien Fuß zu fassen. Neben Waffenlieferungen erhielt Tirana ab 1991 auch Spionagegerät - zu einem Zeitpunkt, als der albanische Geheimdienst mit dem Aufbau der frisch gegründeten UCK begann. Teile der deutschen Lieferungen fand man später im Kosovo. Presseberichten zufolge ging der Bundesnachrichtendienst 1996 zur direkten Ausrüstung der UCK über, die damals mit Bombenanschlägen auf fünf serbische Flüchtlingslager ihre erste große Offensive startete. Die Geheimdienstverbindungen dauern offenbar bis heute an. Wie die Belgrader Presse vor einem Jahr meldete, hatten damals der BND sowie der deutsche Inlandsgeheimdienst mit der Ausbildung von Spionage- und Staatsschutzorganisationen im Kosovo begonnen.[6]
Das gesamte Spektrum
Auf den Geheimdienstkontakten der Vorkriegs- und der Kriegszeit beruhen auch die engen politischen Verbindungen nach Berlin, die die herrschenden Clans in Pristina bis heute unterhalten. Ehemalige UCK-Zöglinge der deutschen Außenpolitik stellen zwei der vier bisherigen “Ministerpräsidenten” des Kosovo. Agim Ceku, im Jahr 1999 als UCK-”Generalstabschef” für den Bodenkrieg im Rahmen des NATO-Überfalls zuständig, leitet seit dem vergangenen Jahr die Regierungsgeschäfte in dem Protektorat. Er wird schwerer Kriegsverbrechen beschuldigt und ist zweimal auf Intervention des Westens ohne Gerichtsbeschluss aus Untersuchungshaft freigekommen. Ramush Haradinaj, Cekus Vorvorgänger im Amt, überführte nach Kriegsende die UCK-Strukturen in das paramilitärische “Kosovo-Schutzkorps”. Über Haradinaj urteilte der BND vor zwei Jahren auf der Basis seiner intimen Kenntnisse der südserbischen Provinz: “Die im Raum Decani auf Familienclan basierende Struktur um Ramush Haradinaj befasst sich mit dem gesamten Spektrum krimineller, politischer und militärischer Aktivitäten, die die Sicherheitsverhältnisse im gesamten Kosovo erheblich beeinflussen. Die Gruppe zählt ca. 100 Mitglieder und betätigt sich im Drogen- und Waffenschmuggel und im illegalen Handel mit zollpflichtigen Waren. Außerdem kontrolliert sie kommunale Regierungsorgane.”[7]
Verachtet
Die Aussicht, dass auf Drängen Berlins derartigen Herrschaftsstrukturen ein eigener Staat überantwortet werden soll, veranlasste den ehemaligen Kosovo-Ombudsmann der Vereinten Nationen, Marek Antoni Nowicki, zu scharfer Kritik. “Die Gesellschaft wird von einem engmaschigen Netz großer albanischer Familien dominiert, die die Region auf klanhafte Weise regieren”, berichtete Nowicki im vergangenen Jahr: “In diesem Teil der Welt ist Zusammenarbeit mit Polizei und Justiz nie geschätzt worden und wird verachtet.”[8] Die Menschenrechtssituation in dem Protektorat liege “immer noch unterhalb der internationalen Mindeststandards”, urteilte er nach einer ausführlichen Analyse des Sicherheits- und Justizsystems sowie von Korruption, Organisierter Kriminalität und Diskriminierung von Minderheiten in dem Sezessionsgebiet.[9] Als die abschließenden Verhandlungen über die Abspaltung des Kosovo unmittelbar bevorstanden, wurde Nowicki von seinem Posten entfernt. Kritische Äußerungen seines Nachfolgers sind nicht bekannt.
Weitere Schwerpunktberichte und Interviews über die Folgen der westlichen Kosovo-Politik bringt german-foreign-policy.com am Ende der Woche.

http://www.german-foreign-policy.com/de/fulltext/56742?PHPSESSID=l83skje7p2m3vq4ee9vg8akki4

US-Finanzprüfer: Etwa 10 Milliarden US$ sind im Irak verschwendet worden

US-Finanzprüfer: Etwa 10 Milliarden US$ sind im Irak verschwendet wordenDiese Verschwendung betrifft aber nur Leistungen
für Projekte, die im Irak zur Verbesserung der
Lebensverhältnisse ausgegeben worden sind. Andere
Verschwendungen sind hier hier berücksichtigt.

Davon hat die Halliburton Co. allein 2,7 Milliar-
den eingestedckt. Die andere Verschwendung wird
auch nicht vorhandene Abrechnungen, nicht ausge-
führte, nicht zu Ende geführte oder mangelhaft
ausgeführt Projekte.

In wieweit hier auch die im Irak allgegenwärtige
Korruption mitspeilt, wird gar nicht erst aufge-
worfen.

 http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/I/IRAQ_RECONSTRUCTION_WASTE?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2007-02-15-13-06-57

Kommentar:

Erst kürlich wurde wieder in den USA die Frage aufge-
worfen, womindestens 4 Mrd. US$ unter dem Prokonsul
Paul Bremer III. im Jahre 2003 geblieben sind. Nun
werden noch größere Summen der Verschwendung aufge-
deckt.

Proteste im Kosovo

Protestë e përleshje në Kosovë

Perleshje12.jpg

Protesta e organizuar të shtunën nga Lëvizja “Vetëvendosje” në ora 14.00, ka përfunduar pas orës 17.00, me shpërndarjen e protestuesve nga policia, e cila kundër tyre ka përdorur gaz lotsjellës. Drejtori i Bordit të QKU-së, Abdyl Krasniqi, tha për media se gjatë protestës së sotme në QKU janë trajtuar 70 raste, 25 nga ata janë të hospitalizuar, ndërsa ndaj katër të lënduarve ka pasur ndërhyrje kirurgjike.

Kosovapress

Prishtinë, 10 shkurt 2007

Pamje nga protestat (marre nga Reuters dhe AP, fotograf Visar Kryeziu dhe Hazir Reka):

Perleshje11.jpg

Perleshje10.jpg

Perleshje9.jpg

Perleshje8.jpg

Perleshje7.jpg

Perleshje6.jpg

Perleshje5.jpg

Perleshje3.jpg

Perleshje2.jpg

Perleshje0.jpg

Perleshje.jpg

A not so peaceful protest

16/02/2007

Albanian bloggers assess the impact of last week’s rioting in Kosovo and the role of Albin Kurti’s “citizen’s movement”.

By Klodjan Seferaj for Southeast European Times – 16/02/07

photoThe demonstration in Pristina turned violent when protesters clashed with police. [Tomislav Georgiev]

As rallies go, it was modest in size. Yet the 2,000 or so pro-independence demonstrators who clashed with police in Kosovo last weekend succeeded in attracting international media attention and forcing the Kosovo government — and UNMIK — into a difficult position. Albanian bloggers have been taking stock of the incident and its repercussions.

Lltako at Peshkapauje has posted photographs, including shots of protesters attacking government property and police responding with tear gas. Scores of people responded. Some express sympathy with the Vetevenosje (Self-Determination) activists, while others doubt they are doing much to help Kosovo Albanians achieve their goal of independence.

L’aiglon wonders how many people are really represented by Albin Kurti’s “citizen’s movement”.

“I am worried about the fact that he speaks so freely in the name of all Kosovo Albanians. Are we sure that these kinds of ‘lightly violent’ demonstrations are really supported by the majority of people, and second, are they in the interest of Kosovo independence?”

“The violence best serves Serbia,” writes Dori. “It’s obvious that that the majority of Kosovo doesn’t agree with it — this is testified by the small number of protesters. They have the right to protest but it is nonsense to provoke violence and damage if they don’t get attention.”

On his blog, however, Erato faults what he sees as an endless series of delays and inconclusive promises. Kosovo Albanians, he writes, are frustrated as the goalposts keep receding further into the distance.

“They said for many years that next year Kosovo is going to be independent,” he writes. “Last year they said that Kosovo will be independent by the end of the year. At the end of the year they said that Kosovo is going to be independent at the beginning of this year, 2007. They said that we should wait just a little, only some weeks until Serbia should hold its elections. They said we should be patient. For sure Ahtisaari is going to bring the independence with his plan.

“Later they said we should not prejudge the content of the plan, let’s wait and see what is written in it … Every time when a promise exceeds its date, they propose another and another.”

Meanwhile, Bytycci wonders if Vetevenosje has veered from its original cause and is “going in favour of those who don’t want the right thing for Kosovo”.

“I was a student at the time when the Student Union organised the protests of October 1, 1997 and I was a participant, but I knew that the cause at that moment was right,” he writes. “Albin didn’t tell us that we were going to attack the Serbian police. The protests were not to be violent. He constantly stressed that they were going to be peaceful and well-organised, in order to show the world that we are civilised.”

Ironically, Vetevenosje didn’t show the same restraint against the Kosovo Police Force, which was only seeking to prevent demonstrators from entering the buildings and paralyzing the Kosovo Albanian-led government, Bytycci notes. “As a citizen I feel sorrow and pain for the two young persons that lost their lives, and for their families at a time when Kosovo should have no victims. It something that Vetevenosje should analyze before deciding on new actions.”

http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/blogreview/2007/02/16/blog-03 

Turkey warns Cyprus regarding offshore oil exploration tender

Turkey warns Cyprus regarding offshore oil exploration tender

16/02/2007

ANKARA, Turkey — The Foreign Ministry warned Cyprus on Thursday (February 15th) to call off a tender granting exploration and drilling rights off the island’s shore. Such tenders “violate the joint rights of the island’s two communities and amount to a fait-accompli,” it said in a statement, charging that Cypriot government’s initiative undermines peace and stability on the island and in the entire region. Cyprus is offering companies the right to explore an area of 70,000 square kilometres for oil. The tender is the first of several licensing rounds, following an agreement among Cyprus, Egypt and Lebanon to establish an exclusive zone for oil and gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean. (Eleftheros Typos, Kathimerini - 16/02/07; RTT, AFX, CNA - 15/02/07)

Belgrade court convicts defendants

Belgrade court convicts defendants in Ibar Highway case

16/02/2007

BELGRADE, Serbia — A Belgrade court on Friday (February 16th) convicted several defendants charged with the 1999 murders of four officials with the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) along the Ibar Highway, and the attempted murder of Vuk Draskovic, SPO leader at the time. Former special police unit chief Milorad Ulemek, also known as “Legija”, was sentenced to 15 years in prison, as was Nenad Ilic, another former member of the Ulemek-run unit. Four more defendants received 14-year sentences. Former State Security chief Rade Markovic was sentenced to eight years in prison, while three other officials got sentences ranging from nine months to 2.5 years. Two of the defendants, Branko Djuric and Milan Radonjic, were acquitted. Verdicts in the first trial involving this case were overturned due to numerous procedural violations. (Beta — 16/02/07)

De Hoop Scheffer: World is watching Kosovo

NATO Bla, Bla, Bla!

De Hoop Scheffer: World is watching Kosovo

16/02/2007

Violence will not be tolerated in Kosovo, while those advocating partition should know this is not an option, NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer said in Pristina on Thursday.

By Blerta Foniqi-Kabashi and Bekim Greicevci in Pristina – 16/02/07

photoNATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer (centre) and KFOR commander Roland Kather head to a press conference after their meeting with the Kosovo negotiation group on Thursday (February 15th). [Getty Images]

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, on a visit to Kosovo, warned that KFOR would not tolerate any form of violence in the province. “If there are people in Kosovo who might think that inciting violence could be the answer, they are wrong and KFOR will prove they’re wrong,” he said at a press conference Thursday (February 15th) following talks with Kosovo leaders, UNMIK head Joachim Ruecker and the commander of KFOR, Lieutenant General Roland Kather.

De Hoop Scheffer arrived in the province five days after weekend clashes between Albanian pro-independence demonstrators and police. Two people died and about 80 were injured after protestors attempted to storm government buildings, leading police to respond with tear gas and rubber bullets.

“Unfortunately, last Saturday we saw an example of how things should not go,” the NATO chief said. “There should be no need for more fatalities and more victims in Kosovo.”

On behalf of the Alliance, he expressed full support for UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari’s status plan, while urging local leaders and all ethnic groups to show maturity in shaping Kosovo’s future.

“As we speak, the world is watching very carefully what kinds of messages come from Kosovo,” he said. “You will be heard, you will be seen, you will be watched by the international community.”

De Hoop Scheffer then travelled to the northern part of Kosovo to meet with the political leaders of Serb communities, who said they do not support Ahtisaari’s plan.

“We support the plan of Belgrade and the resolution adopted by the parliament of Serbia, which rejects Ahtisaari’s package,” said Slavisa Ristic, the mayor of Zubin Potok. Should Kosovo become an independent state, Ristic said, local Serbs will not allow its government to extend its authority to the territories controlled by them.

For his part, de Hoop Scheffer reiterated a Contact Group principle ruling out any breach in Kosovo’s territorial integrity. “The people who would like to work for partition should realise that this is not the solution and this can never be the solution,” he said.

He said he would soon go to Belgrade “to work on Ahtisaari’s basis, because there is really no alternative”.

He promised no downsizing of KFOR troops, saying Kosovo is in an important and sensitive period that needs KFOR at full strength. At present, NATO has approximately 16,000 troops in Kosovo.

Under Ahtisaari’s plan, NATO would continue its presence in Kosovo after the status settlement. “The Western Balkans are an important part of Europe,” de Hoop Scheffer said, stressing the need to “bring this part of the world closer to the Euro Atlantic institutions”.

http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2007/02/16/feature-02

Business: USAID assists job creation in Serbia

Business: USAID assists job creation in Serbia

16/02/2007

Economic growth projects will be implemented in 11 municipalities under a new agreement. Also this week: Macedonia announces a tender for hydropower plant construction, and wages are up in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

photoUS Ambassador to Belgrade Michael Polt sealed a USAID agreement with the mayors of 11 Serbian municipalities on Tuesday (February 13th). [File]

The US Agency for International Development will provide $46.5m in financing for economic growth projects in 11 Serbian municipalities, under an agreement signed on February 13th. US Ambassador Michael Polt stressed that the main goal was to create new jobs. Funding will go to two initiatives — Municipal Economic Growth Activity (MEGA) and the Serbia Contingency Planning and Economic Security Programme (SCOPES).

***

The Macedonian government announced an international tender for the construction and operation of 60 small hydropower plants to be built near the rivers Vardar, Strumica and Crn Drim. Each of the future stations should have an installed capacity of up to 5 megawatts. The deadline for submitting bids is June 14th.

***

A consortium between Telekom Srbija (Serbia) and Ogalar BV (Netherlands) was the sole bidder for a combined second and third generation wireless license in Montenegro. Separately, the two current mobile phone operators, T-mobile and Promonte, submitted bids for 3G network licenses. The ad hoc commission for the tender is expected to take decision by March 15th.

***

Albania’s Economy, Trade and Energy Ministry announced an international tender for selecting a consultant in the privatisation of the Albanian Refining and Marketing of Oil (ARMO) company. The future sales adviser’s name is expected to be known in three months time, according to Minister Genc Ruli.

***

Standard & Poor’s raised its credit rating for Sofia City Hall by one notch to BB+. The outlook remained stable and the short-term rating was left unchanged at B. In a statement, the agency cited the high dependence on financing from the central government budget as a major restraining factor, as well as high infrastructure funding needs. At the same time, it said Sofia remained a central point of foreign investments in Bulgaria.

***

Bosnia and Herzegovina’s (BiH) net average monthly salary amounted to around 313 euros in December 2006, up by 9.7% year-on-year. The net average wage was 2% higher in December, compared to the previous month. Net wages in Republika Srpska were up by 2.4% month-on-month in December, while in the other BiH entity, the Federation of BiH, they grew by 2.1% month-on-month.

(Various sources – 09/02/07-16/02/07)

http://setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/roundup/2007/02/16/roundup-bs-04

Contributions of the Turkish Armed Forces to Middle East Peace Operations

PolicyWatch #1199

Contributions of the Turkish Armed Forces to Middle East Peace Operations

By Selahattin Ibas
February 15, 2007

The general view held by Middle Eastern nations is that political sensitivities make it impossible for regional or neighboring countries to perform peacekeeping in the area. However, the example set by the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) in the past twelve years points to the fallacy of this view.

While fulfilling its responsibilities within the NATO alliance, the TAF continues to improve in both quality and quantity. As the world’s eighth-largest military power — as well as Europe’s largest and NATO’s second largest — the TAF is the most powerful and effective military in the region. Since the end of the Cold War, the peacekeeping operations it has been actively involved in have helped it emerge as an effective force, not only in Turkey’s neighborhood but also in areas as distant as East Timor and Sudan.

The TAF and Peace-Support Operations

The TAF believes that the most effective way of preventing and controlling emerging crises is through international peacekeeping operations. Hence, it supports peacekeeping and humanitarian missions led by the UN, NATO, the European Union, and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), regardless of where such missions take place. The TAF focuses on effective participation in areas that are important to national interests and minimal representative participation in other areas.

The rising threats in the new global security environment, as well as in Turkey’s immediate vicinity, require the development and maintenance of small but agile, self-sufficient, and mobile units. For this reason Turkey has prepared a brigade-level unit as well as a logistical support and humanitarian assistance brigade with the purpose of effectively contributing to potential peace missions.

Paralleling the world’s changes since the end of the Cold War, the number of international peacekeeping operations has increased, as has TAF’s involvement. Its peacekeeping-related activities fall under two main categories: unit-based peacekeeping operations and personnel-based international monitoring missions.

Unit-Based Peacekeeping Operations

The TAF’s first contribution to protecting world peace took place in 1950, when it sent a brigade-level unit of 15,000 soldiers to the Korean War. Since the early 1990s, the TAF has participated in many other operations. In the Balkans, it participated in Bosnia by sending airplanes, ships, and up to a 1,450-person regiment unit and a brigade-level force; in Kosovo, with F-16s, tanker aircraft, and a mechanized unit; in Macedonia, with gendarme and police forces; and in Albania, with an infantry battalion. The TAF contributed to the humanitarian aid efforts following Hurricane Katrina in the United States and the 2005 earthquake in Pakistan. In the broader Middle East, its role has included involvement in:

Somalia. A 300-personnel mechanized unit was sent to help the humanitarian aid and peacekeeping operation between January 1993 and February 1994. Also, its command was for a certain period undertaken by a Turkish lieutenant general…………………..

http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2568